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Property, Sovereignty, and Governable
Spaces
Jacquelyn Amour Jampolskyt
Abstract
This Article responds to the controversy surrounding the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community1 regarding off-reservation assertions of tribal
sovereignty. Although the Bay Mills Court upheld tribal sovereign
immunity over land purchased outside reservation boundaries,
opinions about whether the decision was worth the risk of
pursuing certiorari in an increasingly hostile judicial climate are
decidedly mixed. This Article uses the debates about Bay Mills as
an opportunity for critical analysis of the most common way tribes
attempt to assert sovereignty outside the reservation:
by
purchasing land in fee. Recognizing the limitations of the "fee-totrust" approach, this Article uses critical legal geography to
question the underlying assumption that property rights in land
are necessary for asserting sovereignty. In doing so, the Author
offers the model of "governable spaces" as an alternative way of
conceptualizing sovereignty as spatially contingent and socially

malleable, in order to explore strategic alternatives to the fee-totrust approach. Specifically, the Author argues that usufructuary
rights, contract rights, and consultation rights concomitantly
generate governable spaces through which tribes can expand
sovereignty outside their reservations without purchasing land in
fee. Beyond illuminating ways to avoid litigation, the Author
posits that the governable spaces model is a more sustainable

t. Jacquelyn Amour Jampolsky is an attorney at Berkey Williams LLP, a law
firm that exclusively represents Native American interests. She earned her J.D.
and Ph.D. from the University of Colorado, Boulder, where she served as the Wyss
Fellow for the Getches-Wilkinson Center for Energy, Natural Resources, and the
Environment during the composition of this piece. She would like to thank
Professor Kristen Carpenter for her generous mentorship and invaluable expertise
in drafting this paper from its earliest stages. She would also like to thank
Professor Matthew Fletcher for his time and efforts, and Joseph Bryan and Charles
Wilkinson for their continued support and inspiration.
1. 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
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approach to advancing off-reservation sovereignty claims because
it can flexibly address a broader range of traditionally competing
interests.
Introduction
Recent Supreme Court Indian law jurisprudence regarding
tribal sovereignty illustrates a moment of conflict.'
As tribes
engage in nation-building, 3 in part by seeking opportunities
beyond reservation boundaries to improve the economic, social,
and cultural livelihoods of Native people, they are met by an
increasingly hostile Supreme Court that favors state and federal
interests. 4 Whereas the Court has long affirmed "defensive" claims
of sovereignty to protect tribal interests from encroachments by
state and federal governments, it has yet to affirm "offensive"
claims that assert sovereignty outside reservation boundaries.! To
the contrary, recent cases suggest that tribes' attempts to
transcend the limits of their reservations in pursuit of the kind of
economic and social recovery that is often impossible within those
federally imposed boundaries, trigger at least the consideration
that the offensive assertion of tribal sovereignty should be avoided
altogether.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills
Indian Community6 can be viewed as both an illustration of this
phenomenon and a call for Indian-law scholars and advocates
alike to consider strategies to address the current sovereignty
paradigm. In Bay Mills, the Court reviewed the Tribe's claims
that, pursuant to the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, the

2. See Frank Pommersheim, At the Crossroads: A New and Unfortunate
Paradigmof Tribal Sovereignty, 55 S.D. L. REV. 48 (2010).
3. "Nation-building" refers to the approach that successful tribes and
Indigenous communities have used to pursue economic, cultural, and political
development for their people.
See Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two
Approaches to the Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn't, in
REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 3,

18-32 (Miriam Jorgensen ed., 2007). It can be summarized as an approach where
Native nations assert decision-making power, back up that power with effective
institutions that match Indigenous political culture, and engage in strategic
decision making, and where leaders are both nation-builders and community
mobilizers. Id. This Article uses the concept of nation-building broadly to refer to a
comprehensive mode of governance that seeks socio-economic and institutional
growth in favor of Native people. For a full discussion of nation-building, see
REBUILDING NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT

(Miriam Jorgenson ed., 2007).
4. Pommersheim, supra note 2, at 54.
5. Id. at 55.
6. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014).
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State of Michigan could not sue it over the construction of a casino
on land purchased in fee well outside the reservation boundaries
and brought into trust as "Indian Land" under the Michigan
Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA).' In the months
leading up to the decision, leaders from throughout Indian country
feared that the case would mean the judicial unraveling of tribal
sovereign immunity and tribal sovereignty more generally.8
The Court's ultimate affirmation of tribal sovereign
immunity in its five-four decision inspired a collective sigh of relief
across Indian country. However, the narrow win in Bay Mills
should encourage tribal advocates to think carefully about how
they use sovereignty as a tool to transcend reservation boundaries
in the spirit of nation-building.
Purchasing land outside
reservation boundaries to expand tribal sovereignty is not only
judicially precarious,9 but also limited by significant legal and
bureaucratic hurdles.10
Acquiring fee title in land may be
financially difficult or politically problematic for any number of
practical reasons that would pose obstacles to a purchase. Even if
a tribe can purchase land, it must then petition the Secretary of
the Interior to bring the land into trust for the tribe, and the bestcase scenario secures only a beneficial interest that falls short of
7. Id. at 2029 (citing Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA)
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-143, § 107(a)(3), 111 Stat. 2652, 2658).
8. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, (Re)Solving the Tribal No-Forum Conundrum:
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 311, 314-15
(2013).
9. Id. at 314 ("[Ift appears the Supreme Court, to the horror of Indian Country
and tribal interests, might now resolve this question with a broad stroke. Both the
National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) and the Native American Rights
Fund, collectively representing hundreds of Indian tribes nationally, have
expressed deep concern about the potential for the Supreme Court to undermine
tribal sovereign immunity for all Indian tribes, not only the Bay Mills Indian
Community.").
10. Acquiring fee title alone is not enough to reassert sovereignty over lands
outside reservation boundaries, and the process for bringing land into trust is often
not an option for tribes. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197,
202-03 (2005) (holding that the Oneida Indian Nation could not avoid local
property taxes on fee land, despite its location within the original boundaries of the
Reservation, because such avoidance would disrupt state and local governance); see
also Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012) (creating the
process by which land is brought into trust for the benefit of tribes); Match-E-BeNash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 2202-03
(2012) (allowing private suit to proceed against the government where a party
challenged the Secretary of the Interior's decision to take land into trust, and
expanding the implications of Carcieri u. Salazar); Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S.
379, 382-83 (2009) (holding that tribes that were not federally recognized prior to
1934 are not eligible to have land brought into trust under the IRA); Land
Acquisitions, 25 C.F.R. § 151 (2012) (establishing that the Secretary of the Interior
may deny a request to bring land into trust).
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full legal title.11 Thus the bullet dodged in the Bay Mills case
should be considered less of a triumph than an opportunity to
identify other ways tribes can negotiate reservation boundaries
without risking further judicial erosion of tribal sovereignty.
This Article uses Bay Mills as an opportunity for a critical
analysis12 of the most common way that tribes assert their
sovereignty outside reservation boundaries: by acquiring fee title
ownership in land (the "fee-to-trust" approach).13
The legal
principles giving rise to this state of affairs trace their origins to
the Marshall Court. 14 In Worcester v. Georgia, the Court declared
that Indian tribes are "distinct political communities, having
territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive,
and having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which
is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States."1
In that case, the Marshall Court upheld tribal sovereignty in its
most honest form:
protecting Native lands against state
encroachments and implying full jurisdictional control over any
non-Indians who entered those lands.16 In so finding, the Court
also recognized that those preexisting rights to land justified
upholding tribal sovereignty. 17
Ironically,
this
justification
has
been
historically
demonstrated through the reciprocal practice of dispossession,
which has been the primary means by which the federal
11. See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band, 132 S. Ct. at 2202-03.
12. Scholarship on this case is nascent and generally focuses on the
implications of the holding on state-tribal relations. See, e.g., Federal Indian
Law-Tribal Sovereign Immunity-Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 128
HARV. L. REV. 291, 301 (2014) ("While the Court's decision is a victory for those who
feared the abrogation of tribal immunity, its suggestion that states seek remedies
in state law signals approval of leaving the resolution of legal questions central to
state-tribe disputes to the states, even when the question concerns the extent of
Indian land. Such a view would be inconsistent with recent trends generally
favoring greater federal control and congressional support for tribal selfdetermination, and could result in actions that are detrimental to tribes.").
13. See IRA, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (describing the Secretary of the Interior's
authority to acquire and to hold in trust lands for Indian tribes); Match-E-Be-NashShe-Wish Band, 132 S. Ct. at 2202-03 (describing the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish
Band's attempt to reacquire sovereign lands under the IRA); Carcieri, 555 U.S. at
383-87 (discussing the Narragansett Indian Tribe's struggle to regain its land);
City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 203-12 (explaining the Oneida Indian Nation of New
York's efforts to regain its sovereign land); 25 C.F.R. § 151 (setting forth the
"authorities, policy, and procedures" by which the United States can acquire land to
be held in trust for Indians).
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
15. Id. at 557.
16. Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 9
(1991); see infra Part II.B.
17. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
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government, backed by the Court, systematically stripped tribes of
their sovereign rights.18 Thus, while the fee-to-trust approach
attempts to rectify past historical wrongs through the
reacquisition of land largely as a response to historical
dispossession, it also implicitly adopts the potentially harmful
understanding that property is necessary for expanding
sovereignty. More broadly then, this Article seeks to reevaluate
the assumption that property, as fee ownership in land,
necessarily defines if or where tribes can express sovereignty as a
formal jurisdictional matter.19
The theoretical framework guiding this inquiry draws on
critical legal geography (CLG) as a way to interrogate the
conventional bounds of property and sovereignty as they typically
operate in law.20 CLG scholarship rejects the belief that law
reflects any preexisting or natural division of people or place and

18. See Singer, supra note 16, at 1-2; see also, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia
K. Katyal, & Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022, 1060-61
(2009) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Assn, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), to
illustrate the Court's role in dispossession); Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property
Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Placefor Indians as Nonowners,
52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1066 (2005) (discussing how courts have used property law
to legitimize the dispossession of Indian lands).
19. What sovereignty is, or, moreover, what sovereignty means for Native
people has been the source of a vast and rich body of scholarship, much of which
seeks to deemphasize the role of federal law in defining tribal sovereignty as a
strict matter of jurisdiction. For example, Sarah Krakoff has defined tribal
sovereignty as "a protective shell around tribal life and culture." Sarah Krakoff,
The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV. 797, 804 (2006). Stephen
Cornell and Joseph Kalt have described sovereignty as "de facto sovereignty," or
the real control over internal affairs and resources. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P.
Kalt, Reloading the Dice: Improving the Chances for Economic Development on
American Indian Reservations, in WHAT CAN TRIBES Do? STRATEGIES AND
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1, 14 (Stephen
Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1992). Indeed, scholars have defined sovereignty as
many things, including "cultural sovereignty," "intellectual sovereignty,"
"experiential sovereignty," and "practical sovereignty." See Sarah Krakoff, A
Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent
Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1139, 1191, 1195 (2004) (describing how scholars have
used each of those terms). This Article treats sovereignty broadly as a threshold for
governance. As will be discussed, the purpose of this Article is not to assess what
sovereignty may mean to individual communities, but rather to consider how it can
exist, as an initial matter, with respect property rights in land.
20. See DAVID DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF
WORLD-MAKING: NOMOSPHERIC INVESTIGATIONS (2010) [hereinafter DELANEY, THE
SPATIAL, THE LEGAL, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLD-MAKING] (presenting the
convergence of socio-legal and critical geographic scholarship as a theoretical
framework for critical legal geography); THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW,
POWER, AND SPACE (David Delaney et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the connection
between law and geography, and demonstrating the value of geographical
perspective to the theory and practice of law).
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argues that law and space are mutually and inexorably generative
of each other.21
In the context of Indian law, reservation
boundaries are neither fixed nor physical, but instead reflect a
series of relationships shaped by a violent history of interactions
between people, place, and property law."
This is especially
relevant because the federal government largely fabricated
whatever boundaries do exist through the process of removal and
the imposition of the reservation system. 3 Here, CLG offers a
useful theoretical basis because it calls into question the remedial
effect that property may have for affirming tribal sovereignty in
terms of the law, while also illuminating the correlative sociospatial aspects of property that can help guide advocates toward
strategies that avoid risky litigation.
Geographers Nikolas Rose and Michael Watts have argued
for an alternative to the intransigency of property and sovereignty
as it relates to nation-building through the model of governable
spaces.14 Governable spaces are the "modalities in which a real
and material governable world is composed, terraformed[,] and
populated."" Rather than viewing governance as a system of laws
that reflects some real spatial phenomenon that preexisted society,
the governable spaces model describes governance as a fully
relational grid resulting 6 from a continually malleable imbrication
of law, land, and polity.

21. See DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF WORLDMAKING, supra note 20; THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supranote 20.
22. Nicholas Blomley, Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence: The
Frontier, the Survey, and the Grid, 93 ANNALS ASS'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 121, 123
(2003) [hereinafter Blomley, Law, Property,and the Geography of Violence].
23. This in no way seeks to discount the active role that tribes played in
affirmatively negotiating treaties and reservation boundaries; however, it is likely
safe to say that most tribes would have elected to remain unbounded with respect
to any affirmative rights to land ceded to the broader settler-state. The role of
property, boundaries, and Native dispossession in the making of the modern United
States is discussed further in Part II.B.
24. See NIKOLAS ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT
(1999) [hereinafter ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM]; Nikolas Rose & Mariana
Valverde, Governed by Law?, 7 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 541 (1998); Michael J. Watts,
Antinomies of Community: Some Thoughts on Geography, Resources and Empire,
29 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 195 (2004) [hereinafter Watts,
Antinomies of Community]; Michael Watts, Development and Governmentality, 24
SING. J. TROPICAL GEOGRAPHY 6 (2003); Michael Watts, The Sinister PoliticalLife
of Community: Economies of Violence and Governable Spaces in the Niger Delta,
Nigeria, in THE SEDUCTIONS OF COMMUNITY: EMANCIPATIONS, OPPRESSIONS,
QUANDARIES 101 (Gerald W. Creed ed., 2006) [hereinafter Watts, The Sinister
PoliticalLife of Community].
25. ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM, supra note 24, at 32 (emphasis added).
26. See id. at 31-32.
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To govern is to cut experience in certain ways, to distribute
attractions and repulsions, passions and fears across it, to
bring new facets and forces, new intensities and relations into
being... [and] involves novel ways of cutting up time in order
to govern productive subjects: [W]e must learn to count our
lives by hours, minutes, seconds, the time of work and the
time of leisure, the week and the weekend, opening hours and
closing time .... It is also a matter of space, of the making up
of governable spaces:
populations, nations, societies,
27
economies, classes, families, schools, factories, individuals.
The law may limit tribal sovereignty through traditional
interpretations of reservation boundaries as dispositive of civil and
regulatory jurisdiction. But CLG and the model of governable
spaces suggests that the law, vis-A-vis property, may also afford
opportunities to transcend these limitations when pursuing
nation-building beyond reservation boundaries.
Practically speaking, CLG and the model of governable
spaces illuminate other ways tribes can expand their sovereignty
and pursue off-reservation interests without acquiring fee title
ownership in land. In employing these concepts, this Article
challenges the traditional role of property as something that is
necessarily generative or limiting of tribal sovereignty to promote
a shift from a land-based and jurisdictional understanding of
sovereignty toward a relational mode of governance. 2' This Article
further aims to inspire discussions about the role of CLG in
Indian-law advocacy and property-law scholarship alike.
To advance these claims, this Article is organized into four
major parts. Part I traces the conventional fee-to-trust approach
to offensive off-reservation sovereignty claims through case law
and points out the practical and theoretical limitations of the
approach. Part II introduces the CLG framework and the concept
of governable spaces as an alternative way of conceptualizing the
relationship between property and sovereignty. Part III applies
the governable spaces model for exploring strategic alternatives to
the fee approach to expanding tribal sovereignty through the lens
of resource management. Specifically, it looks at three types of

27. Id. at 31.
28. This Article in no way seeks to diminish the significance of tribally owned
lands for the cultural, political, and economic survival of tribal communities. To
the contrary, this Article fully supports the proposition that tribally owned lands
are an inextricable part of sustaining Native cultures and achieving economic
growth-and it even recognizes that the relationship Native people maintain with
traditional lands is an expression of tribal sovereignty in and of itself. The goal
here is to address a fundamental limiting factor of tribal sovereignty from a judicial
perspective, while also addressing how communities that have been left out of the
traditional property-as-sovereignty paradigm may engage in nation-building.
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rights: (1) usufructuary rights, as in the case of off-reservation
hunting and fishing treaty rights and common-law, non-owner
property rights; (2) contract rights, as in contractual comanagement agreements and conservation easements with land
trusts; and (3) consultation rights, as in national laws governing
cultural heritage and the environment and international laws
governing human rights. Part III examines these rights as a
means for advancing tribal interests outside reservation
boundaries, while laying the groundwork for cooperative
arrangements that trigger fewer dangerous legal interactions.
Finally, Part IV concludes by providing examples outside the
natural resources context of how tribes engage in governance
beyond reservation boundaries and addresses potential critiques.
I.

Bay Mills and the Conventional Approach to Property
and Sovereignty
A.

Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community

The Bay Mills Indian Community ("Bay Mills") is a federally
recognized Tribe with a reservation that falls within the northern
borders of the State of Michigan.29 In 1997, Congress enacted the
Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA) 39 to
compensate the Bay Mills and four other Michigan tribes for lands
ceded through two treaties in the 1800s. 31 As part of MILCSA,
Congress directed that twenty percent of the monies awarded to
Bay Mills be placed in a Land Trust Fund, where all earnings
would "be used exclusively for improvements on tribal land or the
consolidation and enhancement of tribal landholdings through
purchase and exchange... [and where a]ny land acquired with
funds 2from the Land Trust shall be held as Indian lands are
3
held."

29. Respondent's Brief in Opposition at 2, Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,
134 S. Ct. 2024 (2014) (No. 12-515) [hereinafter Brief in Opposition].
30. Michigan Indian Land Claims Settlement Act (MILCSA), Pub. L. No. 105143, 111 Stat. 2652 (1997).
31. Treaty of Mar. 28, 1836, 7 Stat. 491; Treaty of Aug. 2, 1855, 11 Stat. 631;
see also Brief in Opposition, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that inadequate
compensation was originally awarded by the Indian Claims Commission pursuant
to the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70n-2).
32. Brief for Respondent at 11, Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. 2024 (No. 12-515)
[hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (quoting MILCSA § 107(a)(3)).
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In August of 2010, Bay Mills used earnings from the Land
Trust Fund to purchase a plot of land in Vanderbilt, Michigan,
about 125 miles outside its reservation boundaries.33 Bay Mills
then opened a small gaming facility on the parcel, believing that
the land purchased with the earnings from the Land Trust Fund
would automatically be eligible for gaming under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),34 and thus would be subject to the
Tribe's sovereign jurisdiction "as Indian lands are held.35
Michigan sued Bay Mills in federal court, alleging that the gaming
facility violated federal and state gaming laws, as well as the
Tribe's gaming compact with the State, because
the Vanderbilt
36
property was "located outside Indian lands.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the
doctrine of sovereign immunity shielded Bay Mills from being sued
for gaming activities on the purchased lands.
In ruling in favor
of tribal immunity, the Court reasserted that general principles of
immunity are one of the "core aspects of sovereignty that tribes
possess '3 '3 and "a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and
self-governance. 3 9 Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan reiterated
the long-established standard that the only way the Tribe would
lose immunity from suit would be if the Tribe waived it or if
Congress abrogated4" some aspect of it through legislation.41
According to the majority opinion, this standard applies regardless
of whether the activity giving rise to the suit took place outside
reservation boundaries.42
Thus, in reviewing whether the Tribe was immune from suit,
the Court revisited whether Congress had abrogated immunity for
gaming activity outside reservation boundaries under IGRA
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii), and, if not, whether the Court should reverse
the prior precedent established in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v.

33. Id. at 12.

34. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(B) (2012).
35. Brief for Respondent, supra note 32, at 11.
36. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2029.
37. Id. at 2030.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng'g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 890 (1986)).
40. Congress retains plenary power over Indian affairs and the exclusive
authority to abrogate tribal sovereignty through legislation. United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
41. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2031 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)).
42. Id. at 2033.
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Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.43 that preserved immunity from
suit for commercial activities outside reservation boundaries.44
The Court ruled in favor of Bay Mills on both issues.45 First it
found that, although IGRA abrogates immunity from suit for
disputes over state-tribal gaming compacts for facilities operating
within the reservation boundaries, the statute does not expressly
do so for disputes arising on off-reservation lands. 46 And as an
institutional matter, whatever "anomaly" the text of IGRA creates,
it is up to Congress, and not the Court, to remedy.47
Second, the Court declined to overturn Kiowa Tribe, holding
that no special circumstances existed to justify ignoring stare
decisis in this case. 4 Despite Michigan's argument that "tribes
increasingly participate in off-reservation gaming and other
commercial activity, and operate in that capacity less as
governments than as private businesses,, 49 the Court preserved
the Kiowa Tribe precedent, and therefore tribal immunity from
suit for commercial activities outside reservation boundaries. 0
Again, the Court stated that Congress must be the one to revise
immunity5 1 from suits arising from off-reservation commercial
activities.
There are a few ways to assess the legal significance of the
Bay Mills decision. By affirming Kiowa Tribe, the Court upheld
immunity from suit as one of the fundamental tenets of tribal
sovereignty, even with respect to commercial activities outside
reservation boundaries.52

At the same time, however, the Court

left open some important questions about the future of tribal
immunity.
The Court did little to resolve the "non-forum
conundrum" associated with issues of immunity,5 3 and included

43. Id.
44. Id. at 2032.
45. Id. at 2039.
46. Id. at 2033-34.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2036.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2037.
51. Id.
52. The Tenth Circuit recently applied Bay Mills to bar the state of Oklahoma
from suing the Kialegee Tribal Town for a gaming facility constructed outside
reservation lands. Oklahoma v. Hobia, 771 F.3d 1247, 1248 (10th Cir. 2014).
53. The "non-forum conundrum" is where tribal sovereign immunity leaves
plaintiffs with no forum to hear their claims because a tribe has not established a
functioning tribal judicial system. Fletcher, supra note 8, at 312; see Frank
Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction,
31 ARIZ. L. REV. 329, 347-51 (1989); see also Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country's
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some strongly worded dicta urging Congress to legislate and,
perhaps not so subtly, to limit the application of tribal immunity
for off-reservation commercial activities.5 4 So depending on how
Congress and the lower courts treat this dicta and the unanswered
questions in Bay Mills, tribes seeking to expand their sovereign
authority outside reservation boundaries may be in a less secure
position than they would have been should the Court have
declined to grant certiorari at all.
From a conceptual perspective, both Michigan and the Court
seemed less disturbed by the general concept of tribal sovereign
immunity than by where and for what the tribe asserted it.
Neither the Court nor disputing stakeholders were arguing about
the application of sovereignty as a discrete principle of law derived
from fee-title ownership in land alone. Instead, they appeared to
be discussing sovereignty as a proxy for justifying (or not)
relationships of control among Native and non-Native neighbors.
Perhaps more important than the doctrinal implications of an
immunity ruling, the decision would have profound implications

Borders: Territoriality, Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51
B.C. L. REV. 595 (2010) (discussing the consequences of the Court's decisions to
limit tribal-court jurisdiction while protecting tribal sovereign immunity); Peter
Nicolas, American-Style Justice in No Man's Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 895 (2002)
(proposing solutions to the non-forum conundrum).
54. Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2038-39 ("And Congress repeatedly had done just
that: It had restricted tribal immunity 'in limited circumstances' ..... [W]e act
today against the backdrop of a congressional choice: to retain tribal immunity (at
least for now) in a case like this one .... Having held in Kiowa that this issue is up
to Congress, we cannot reverse ourselves because some may think its conclusion
wrong. Congress of course may always change its mind-and we would readily
defer to that new decision.").
55. Courts are increasingly using demographics and other extra-judicial sources
to divest tribes of some aspects of sovereignty. This appears most blatantly in the
"diminishment" or "disestablishment" cases where courts have used demographic
indicators to change the boundaries of reservations. See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 471-72 (1984) ("Where non-Indian settlers flooded into the opened
portion of a reservation and the area has long since lost its Indian character, we
have acknowledged that de facto, if not de jure, diminishment may have occurred.
In addition to the obvious practical advantages of acquiescing to de facto
diminishment, we look to the subsequent demographic history of opened lands as
one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen once land on a
particular reservation was opened to non-Indian settlers." (citations omitted));
Charlene Koski, The Legacy of Solem v. Bartlett: How Courts Have Used
Demographics To Bypass Congress and Erode the Basic Principles of Indian Law,
84 WASH. L. REV. 723 (2009). Courts also use demographics and these extrajudicial sources in criminal and other tribal jurisdiction cases. See, e.g., Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (citing various historical sources to
support its conclusion that tribal courts should not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians); Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the Supreme Court's
(Re)construction of the Indian Canons, 35 VT. L. REV. 623 (2011) (criticizing the
Court's use of these extra-judicial sources).
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on who, from a political and racial standpoint, would be able to
assert control over whom. This highlights the socio-spatial and
relational aspect of off-reservation sovereignty disputes. Bay Mills
was not just about sovereignty as a matter of right, but rather was
about the power to decide who can do what, with what, and where.
Consider Michigan's attempt to resuscitate Justice Stevens's
dissent in Kiowa Tribe, where he argued that the Court has "never
considered whether a tribe is immune from a suit that has no
meaningful nexus to the tribe's land or its sovereign function. ' 6
Bay Mills generated a common skepticism from Indian Country,
the State of Michigan, and the Court alike about the applicability
of sovereign immunity over lands purchased outside reservation
boundaries for activities not popularly associated with tribal selfgovernance. The Stevens dissent in Kiowa Tribe, Michigan's
argument in Bay Mills, and skepticism about off-reservation
claims to sovereignty more generally rely on the assumption that
there must be some "meaningful nexus ' 7 between the tribe's land
and sovereign function. This assumption simultaneously guides
the conventional fee-to-trust approach used by many tribes to
expand their sovereign authority, like in Bay Mills, and begs
heightened scrutiny from courts.
B. A Critique of the Fee-to-TrustApproach
In City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 8 the
Oneida Indian Nation purchased in fee two parcels of land that
were originally within the Tribe's reservation boundaries in an
attempt to offensively assert its sovereign authority against the
State of New York by increasing its property holdings in land. 9
The Tribe opened a gas station, a convenience store, and a textile
factory on the purchased land, and refused to pay state property
taxes over the parcels in question. 6' The Tribe claimed that, by
purchasing former Oneida land on the open market, it had revived
its exempt status as a sovereign. 1 On review, the Supreme Court
rejected "the unification theory of [the Tribe] and the United
States and [held] that 'standards of federal Indian law and federal

56. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 764 (1997) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
59. Id. at 210-12.
60. Id. at 211.
61. Id.

2016]

Property,Sovereignty, and Governable Spaces

99

equity practice' preclude the Tribe from rekindling embers of
sovereignty that long ago grew cold. 6 2 In other words, property
rights could not justify tribal control over non-members.63
In City of Sherrill, like in Bay Mills, the type of property
rights the Oneida Indian Nation retained in the parcels was the
dispositive issue.64 Because the Tribe purchased the land on the
open market, but the Secretary of the Interior had not brought the
land into trust for the Tribe under the Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA)," the Court found that the Tribe had no sovereign authority
over the land." Instead, the Court applied the state-law doctrines
of laches, impossibility, and acquiescence to hold that "unilateral
reestablishment of present and future Indian sovereign control,
even over land purchased at the market price, would have
disruptive practical consequences," especially because the parcels
in question were inhabited by mostly non-Indians." Courts have
used the Sherrill reasoning to dismiss several similar tribal-land
claims in the years following the decision."

62. Id. at 214.
63. This outcome is largely inconsistent with private property rights afforded to
non-Natives. For a comprehensive discussion of the inconsistent treatment of
Native and non-Native property rights as it relates to political power and tribal
sovereignty, see Singer, supra note 16, at 3-4 ("On the contrary, fee interests
owned by non-Indians are subject to various kinds of legal protection which the
Court denies to tribal property and to restricted trust allotments owned by tribal
members. Although the courts accord the forms of property associated with nonIndian traditions a high degree of legal protection, property interests traditionally
held by Indian nations and tribal members are often treated as a commons
available for non-Indian purposes when needed by non-Indians. The commitment
to individual dignity and restraint of tyrannical governmental power purportedly
underlying non-Indian property law does not appear to extend fully to Indian
owners. The usual restraints on tyrannical government power work haphazardly
or not at all when federal power over Indians is concerned.").
64. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 211-12.
65. Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012); 25 C.F.R.
§ 151.10(f) (2012). Contra Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024,
2029 (2014) (applying a specific statute, MILCSA, causing the land to be considered
"Indian lands").
66. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221.
67. Id. at 219-20 (citation omitted).
68. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Kathryn E. Fort & Nicholas J. Reo, Tribal
Disruptionand Indian Claims, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 65, 67 (2014);
see also Cayuga Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 2005)
(applying Sherrill to hold that laches barred the tribe's land claim); Kathryn Fort,
Disruption and Impossibility: The New Laches and the Unfortunate Resolution of
the Modern Iroquois Land Claims, 11 WYO. L. REV. 375 (2011) (discussing the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decisions on this issue); Kathryn E. Fort, The New
Laches: Creating Title Where None Existed, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 357 (2009)
(arguing that the post-Sherrill decisions created a new laches defense that could
quash Indian land claims).
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City of Sherrill demonstrates one of the major legal limits to
the fee-to-trust approach for expanding tribal sovereignty:
Acquiring fee title alone is not enough to reassert sovereignty over
lands outside reservation boundaries.69 Successfully expanding
sovereign authority through purchase requires either specific
statutory authority that automatically converts purchased fee land
into "Indian land," like with MILCSA in Bay Mills, 79 or Secretarial
approval to bring purchased land back into trust under the IRA. 1
Before the Secretary of the Interior may bring land into trust for a
tribe, he or she must consider "the tribe's need for additional
land"; "[t]he purposes for which the land will be used"; "the impact
on the State and its political subdivisions resulting from the
removal of the land from the tax rolls"; and the "[j]urisdictional
72
problems and potential conflicts of land use which may arise.
With the growth of Indian gaming and continuing conflict over
regulatory, tax, planning, and zoning disputes with surrounding
states and communities, the trust acquisition process has become
increasingly precarious and fraught with opposition.
Beyond the adversarial trend in and internal deficiencies of
4
the land-into-trust
process itself,7
the
Court's recent
interpretation of the IRA in Carcieri v. Salazar7 further limited
the Secretary of the Interior's discretion under that statute. 76 In
Carcieri, the Court held that only tribes under federal jurisdiction
in 1934 are eligible under the IRA."
In that case, the
Narragansett Tribe, whose land is surrounded by the state of
Rhode Island, petitioned the Secretary to bring thirty-one acres of

69. See City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214.
70. See Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2029.
71. Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 465 (2012); 25 C.F.R.
§ 151 (2012).
72. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 221 (alteration in original) (quoting 25 C.F.R.
§ 151.10(o).
73. See Kelsey J. Waples, Extreme Rubber-Stamping: The Fee-to-Trust Process
of the Indian ReorganizationAct of 1934, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 251, 253 (2012).
74. For a full account of the problems with the land-into-trust process, see
Amanda D. Hettler, Beyond a Carcieri Fix: The Need for Broader Reform of the
Land-into-Trust Process of the Indian ReorganizationAct of 1934, 96 IOwA L. REV.
1377 (2011); see also Frank Pommersheim, Land into Trust: An Inquiry into Law,
Policy, and History, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 519, 541 (2013) (exploring Supreme Court
cases which involve the land-into-trust doctrine).
75. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009).
76. Hettler, supra note 74, at 1390 ("The Secretary, however, delegated this
authority to an Assistant Secretary, who then delegated it to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs ....
").
77. Carcieri,555 U.S. at 383.
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land it had purchased in fee into trust under the IRA. 8 The Tribe
sought to construct a housing project on the purchased land, and a
dispute arose about whether the project needed to comply with the
local building code.79 The Secretary approved the Narragansett
Tribe's petition to bring the purchased land into trust, thereby
exempting the housing project from local laws pursuant to tribal
sovereignty, and the State of Rhode Island appealed the
Secretary's decision."
On certiorari,81 the Court reviewed the meaning of IRA
§ 479.82 The Court found that "the term 'now under Federal
jurisdiction' in § 479 unambiguously refers to those tribes that
were under the federal jurisdiction of the United States when the
IRA was enacted in 1934
In other words, after Carcieri, any
tribe seeking to bring fee land into trust under the IRA must have
been recognized by the federal government in 1934, at the time the
IRA was passed. This seriously limits the fee-to-trust approach to
expanding tribal sovereignty over lands outside reservation
boundaries because it may4 exclude many tribes that were not
recognized until after 1934.1
In addition to the legal limitations of the fee-to-trust
approach, there may be some practical reasons why purchasing
lands to expand sovereign authority would not work. Tribes may
lack money to purchase more land on the open market; they may
lack the internal institutional or political support to do so; or it
may be impractical to buy certain lands, such as those that are
environmentally contaminated. Even non-disruptive attempts to

78. Id. at 385. The Tribe's argument-that because it had had purchased the
land outright it should automatically be deemed Indian Country as a "dependent
Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151-ultimately failed." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. Petitioners initially brought suit under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 387. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Rhode Island granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of the
Interior and the Tribe. Carcieri v. Norton, 290 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D.R.I. 2003).
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in panel, Carcieri v. Norton, 423 F.3d
45 (2005), and en banc, 497 F.3d 15 (2007), and the Supreme Court ultimately
granted certiorari, Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 552 U.S. 1443 (2008).
82. Carcieri,555 U.S. at 387-93 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 479).
83. Id. at 395.
84. Carcieriand the land-into-trust process was further limited by Match-E-BeNash-She-Wish Band of Pottowatomi Indians u.Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012).
See J. Matthew Martin, The Supreme Court Erects a Fence Around Indian Gaming,
39 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 45 (2014) (discussing the implications of the decision).
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expand sovereign authority over lands outside reservation
boundaries have proven unsuccessful in a post-Sherrill, postCarciericlimate.
For example, in Onondaga Nation v. New York, the
Onondaga Nation attempted to regain control over their sacred
Onondaga Lake by alleging that any title that may have passed to
the lake was null for violating various treaties and the Trade and
Intercourse Act.86 In that case, the Tribe did not attempt to
purchase the land in fee, but rather tried to prove that the titles of
those who had were invalid. 7 The U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of New York ruled against the Tribe, 8 and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by applying the
reasoning in Sherrill.9 The Second Circuit held that, because the
current inhabitants of the land at issue were predominantly nonIndian, and because so much time had passed, the current
landowners had justifiable expectations, and the "doctrines of
laches, acquiescence, and impossibility," applied. 0
But the
Onondaga Nation filed the suit in part to prevent fee owners from
further polluting the sacred lake and to compel them to clean it
up. 1 In this way, Ononodaga demonstrates perhaps the major
reason why tribes seek to assert sovereignty over lands outside
reservation boundaries through the fee-to-trust approach:
to
expand tribal authority to govern. 2 This is not just governance for
governance's sake, but the means by which tribes can preserve
tribal values in nation-building.

85. See Fletcher, supranote 8, at 314-15 (noting the low "win rate" for tribes in
cases in which they are parties before the Supreme Court).
86. Onondaga Nation v. New York, No. 5:05-CV-0314 (LEK/RFT), 2010 WL
3806492, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2010), affd, 500 F. App'x 87 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 419 (2013).
87. Plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motions to Dismiss,
OnondagaNation, No. 5:05-CV-0314, 2007 WL 4659828.
88. OnondagaNation, 2010 WL 3806492, at *1.
89. Onondaga Nation v. New York, 500 F. App'x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 419 (2013).
90. Id.
91. OnondagaNation, 2010 WL 3806492, at *2.
92. See, e.g., Joyce Tekahnawiiaks King, The Value of Water and the Meaningof
Water Law for the Native Americans Known as the Haudenosaunee, 16 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 449, 471 (2007) ("The legendary titleholder Tadadaho, Sid Hill,
stated, 'The incomplete plan to clean up Onondaga Lake is only the latest example
of the New York State and federal authorities' inability to care for our land .... In
asserting our land rights, we insist that polluted areas be cleaned up and that the
lands and waters be protected for generations to come."').
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The latent assumption in these cases-that fee ownership is
necessary to assert the sovereign authority to govern-can be
traced back as early as the Marshall Court.
According to Chief Justice Marshall, the original
understanding of the sovereignty and property rights of Indian
nations was that Indian tribes would retain both an absolute
right of occupancy of their lands and a sovereign power to
exercise governmental authority within their territory, until
voluntarily ceded to the United States.93
Although the reciprocal conclusion-that fee ownership also
delimits tribal authority to govern-is legally questionable, 94
courts have used that assumption to divest tribes of their ability to
govern over fee lands owned by non-Indians, even within
reservation boundaries. 9 The idea that a sovereign's authority to
govern originates in property ownership has been used to justify
the historical physical and political divesture of tribes by the
federal government.96 Following suit, the conventional fee-to-trust
approach tribes use to regain or expand their sovereign authority
outside reservation boundaries positions property as the remedial
thread for righting past wrongs.

93. Singer, supranote 16, at 14.
94. See id. at 24 ("To argue that the tribe cannot determine the basic character
of the area because it does not own all the property on the Reservation makes no
sense." (discussing the Court's reasoning in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes, 492
U.S. 408 (1989)).
95. From a legal perspective, this includes limiting a tribe's ability to govern
vis-a-vis civil regulatory jurisdiction. E.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,
697 (1993) (holding that the Cheyenne River Sioux could not regulate hunting and
fishing by nonmembers on Tribal trust land); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 422 (1989) (holding that the
Yakima Tribe could not zone unrestricted "open" fee lands within reservation
boundaries); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566-67 (1981) (holding that
the Crow Tribe could not regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on land
owned by nonmembers within the reservation unless two narrow exceptions
applied). This also includes civil and criminal adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Sarah
Krakoff, Tribal Civil JudicialJurisdictionover Nonmembers: A PracticalGuide for
Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187 (2010) (discussing judicial jurisdiction within
reservation boundaries); M. Gatsby Miller, The Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil Cases, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1825 (2014) (discussing the relationship between tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction
and adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers within reservation boundaries).
96. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 16, at 32 ("Property rights may constitute a
source of sovereignty; ownership of property may seem to entail the right to use and
develop that property unless those rights are limited by regulations promulgated
by a democratic government with which the owner has a social contract."); see also
Blomley, Law, Property, and the Geography of Violence, supra note 22 (discussing
how property ownership relates to power).
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The conventional approach, however, sees both the
sovereignty problem and its solution in terms of the law. This
Article introduces the critical legal geography framework to
reexamine the assumption that property in land necessarily
presupposes and delimits sovereignty by viewing the construction
of space and law as mutually and concomitantly generative of each
other. This approach deemphasizes fee acquisition as a necessary
step to expanding sovereign authority to govern, and it opens new
strategic and theoretical discussions about how tribes can
circumscribe the "unfortunate paradigm" of tribal sovereignty.
IL Critical Legal Geography and the Concept of
Governable Spaces
A. The Discipline
Traditionally, lawyers study law, and geographers study
space.97 Critical legal geography argues that the conventional
understanding of space and law as separate categories relies in
part on the implicit differences between the disciplines.98
Adhering to these disciplinary categories does not reflect any real
boundaries, but rather fabricates them, lending an incomplete
understanding of both spatial and legal processes and reifying
entrenched ways of understanding either."
But space is not a
discernable external or acultural entity; the material or lived
character of space is produced by our reactions to it.100 Legal
norms shape these reactions by categorizing, naming, prohibiting,
or encouraging certain interactions among people1 91 according to
legally delineated spaces.1 °2 The law writes and re-writes social

97. Nicholas K. Blomley, Text and Context: Rethinking the Law-Space Nexus, 13
PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 512, 512-13 (1989) [hereinafter Blomley, Rethinking
the Law-Space Nexus].
98. Id.
99. Nicholas K. Blomley & Joel C. Bakan, Spacing Out: Towards a Critical
Geography of Law, 30 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 661, 663 (1992).
100. See HENRI LEFEBVRE, THE PRODUCTION OF SPACE (Donald Nicholson-Smith
trans., 1991); DOREEN MASSEY, SPATIAL DIVISIONS OF LABOR: SOCIAL STRUCTURES

AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF PRODUCTION 52 (1984); Raka Shome, Space Matters: The
Power and Practiceof Space, 13 COMM. THEORY 39 (2003).
101. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REV. 4, 7-8
(1983).
102. See, e.g., DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF
WORLD-MAKING, supra note 20, at 5-8; Vera Chouinard, Geography, Law and
Legal Struggles: Which Ways Ahead?, 18 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 415, 430
(1994) ("Law's space not only threads its way throughout our daily lives, often in
the 'background' of our consciousness, but it is also a material and conceptual
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relations of power by anchoring them in space and time, mutually
constituting both." 3 Understanding the law as an isolated, aspatial matter of discourse equally obscures the spatial
relationships of power and ignores "how 10law
is everywhere in
4
space ...[and] space is everywhere in law.,
In the early 1990s, theorists in the fields of law and
geography joined forces and created a standalone transdisciplinary framework, which gained momentum in the new
millennium.1 0 5 Early scholarship focused primarily on the spatiolegal nexus of cities through issues such as zoning, landlord-tenant
relationships, and vagrancy.0 6 Today, the discipline has changed
to reflect new synergies between critical geography and critical
legal theory in order to tackle larger questions of land reform,
geopolitical order,0 7 social justice, political economy, and
environmental studies.0 8 Increasingly, legal scholars have used
critical legal geography as an analytical framework for
understanding both the operation of law as an institution and its
operation in practice.' °9 As a whole, critical legal geography stands

medium through which people fight for the control and use of space itself.");
Desmond Manderson, Interstices:New Work on Legal Spaces, 9 L. TEXT CULTURE 1,
1 (2005) ("Admittedly, law understands itself as spatially delimited.").
103. Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 L. & SOC'Y REV. 567, 569-70
(1998) [hereinafter Blomley, Landscapes of Property].
104. Igor Stramignoni, Francesco's Devilish Venus: Notations on the Matter of
Legal Space, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 147, 184 (2004).
105. Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of "Moo Ha Ha"-A Tribute to Keith Aoki's
Role in Developing CriticalLegal Geography, 90 OR. L. REV. 1233, 1238-39 (2012)
[hereinafter Osofsky, The Geography of "Moo Ha Ha'].
106. See THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 20.
107. See id.
108. Alexandre Kedar, On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler States:
Notes Towards a Research Agenda, 5 CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 401, 405-06 (2003);
Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on the New Haven School, 32
YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 432-34 (2007); see also, e.g., Ruth Buchanan, Border
Crossings: NAFTA, Regulatory Restructuring, and the Politics of Place, in THE
LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 285 (David Delaney et al.
eds., 2001) (political economy); Leila M. Harris & Helen D. Hazen, Power of Maps:
(Counter)Mapping for Conservation,4 ACME 99 (2006) (conservation).
109. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, (Intellectual)Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward
a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (using critical
legal geography to assess intellectual property protections across borders); Keith
Aoki, Space Invaders: Critical Geography, the "Third World" in InternationalLaw
and CriticalRace Theory, 45 VILL. L. REV. 913 (2000) (discussing the use of political
geography in Critical Race Theory); Deborah G. Martin, Alexander W. Scherr &
Christopher City, Making Law, Making Place: Lawyers and the Production of
Space, 34 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 175 (2010) (proposing a framework for
practicing lawyers' participation in legal geography research); Osofsky, The
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for the proposition that the conventional separation of the law
from the lived, or physical, characteristics of space is not only
inadequate, but skews toward deliberate and deep-rooted
structures of power.110
Critical legal geography aids in understanding how tribes can
expand their interests outside reservation boundaries without
necessarily acquiring fee title to property because it recasts the
relationship between property and sovereignty as one that is
spatially contingent and socially malleable. From this perspective,
"property rights do not constitute a pre-existing socio-spatial
order" that the law describes.111 Properties are made; and they are
made to order the world by mandating who can do what, with
what, and where.112
Because property as a legal construct
concomitantly generates the space that upholds it, tribes can use
property to negotiate categories of space and law that exceed both
the physical boundaries of reservations and the legal categories of
property rights.
To fully understand this potential, however, it is important to
consider the relationship between property and sovereignty in the
context of the political and economic project in which the
relationship originates. The following tells one story 113 of the
origins of property based in CLG and broader social theory, with
specific reference to Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation.

Geography of 'Moo Ha Ha," supra note 105, at 1245 (lauding Professor Keith Aoki's
exploration of "the intersection of power, inequality, and law, especially with
respect to sovereignty and property" using critical legal geography).
110. Chouinard, supra note 102, at 415.
111. Joe Bryan, Walking the Line: ParticipatoryMapping, Indigenous Rights,
and Neoliberalism,42 GEOFORuM 40, 40 (2011).
112. See Blomley, Law, Property,and the Geography of Violence, supra note 22.
113. It is important to acknowledge that there are different approaches to the
evolution of the theory of property that may challenge or enhance this version of
the story. For a survey of differing accounts, see GREGORY S. ALEXANDER &
EDUARDO M. PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY (2012).
114. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (Beacon Press 2d ed. 2001) (1944). Karl Polanyi
(1886-1964) was a Hungarian-American social theorist who is most famous for his
work challenging liberal economic thought by highlighting the role of culture in the
formation of markets and the role of markets in the formation of nation-states.
Karl Polanyi, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/biography/
Karl-Polanyi (last visited Feb. 7, 2016). Although Polanyi received little acclaim
during his life, his theoretical approach to understanding modern political economy
has become significant in recent years as popular economists such as Joseph
Stieglitz have used Polanyi's work to justify critiques of the self-regulating market.
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Foreword to the Second Edition of KARL POLANYI, THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME, at
vii (Beacon Press 2d ed. 2001) (1944).

2016]

Property,Sovereignty, and Governable Spaces
B.

107

The Remedial Thread: A Critical Legal Geography Take
on Property

Although the concept of "property" can be attributed to a
"complicated set of relations that would stretch back in time," the
early reference to property as a systematically acquirable legal
construct be traced to the late seventeenth-century works of John
Locke. 115 In 1690, Locke published his seminal work Of Property
as the fifth chapter of the second treatise in his Two Treatises of
Government as an attempt to justify the link between ownership in
land and labor. 1 6 He argued that God gave the world to men in
common, and that individuals could secure ownership over land at
the exclusion of others by working it.11 7 However, Locke's theory of
property must be considered as a direct response to the growing
class of poor, landless peasants who were increasingly pushed into
wage labor as a result of the enclosures in England."'
Beginning in the fourteenth century, in what is known as the
English enclosures, the wealthy class fenced off parcels of land in
the countryside that had historically been held in common,
physically, and often violently, excluding the rural class. 9 The
self-proclaimed "owners" of these lands then converted them from
agricultural use to pasture, largely to raise sheep for the
production and sale of wool, but they also harvested iron, coal, or
whatever other resources might exist on the land.1 2'
The
enclosures peaked during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
when an increasingly international market caused the price of
wool to skyrocket, as did the legitimacy of property rights in
British common law. 121
The enclosures introduced the idea of land as something that
could be privately owned and, moreover, is valuable and alienable
in terms of money-a critical invention for the free market.1 2 2 The
value of property in land was calculated by what could be
produced from it, fundamentally shaping how the landscape is
viewed in terms of resources today. 123 Property grew hand in hand
115. STUART ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY 2, 305 (2013) [hereinafter ELDEN,
THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY].

116. Id. at 305.
117. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1689), reprinted in
LOCKE'S TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285, 305-06 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967).

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY, supra note 115, at 304-07.
See POLANYI, supra note 114, at 36-42.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36-44.
Id. at 42-44.
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with the free market, which continuously fractionated nature into
individual resources that were equally able to be owned, to be sold,
and to exclude the societal forces that produced them. 12 4 Any
understanding of property or environmental management today
thus must acknowledge how resources came to be viewed as
manageable commodities through, and as properties valued on,
the market.12
The disaster that befell the English countryside as a result of
the enclosures and the increasing exploitation of land and labor
inspired Locke's understanding of property as a necessary solution
to safeguard the commons.1"6 William Blackstone solidified Locke's
understanding of property in the British common law with his
treatise, Commentaries on the Law of England.11 7 Like Locke,
Blackstone also described the evolution of property from a state of
pristine nature where God bequeathed ownership over all things
to mankind alone."' Blackstone also largely wrote in response to
an increasingly frightening scenario in the British countryside,
where individualistic rights of possession were conflicting. For
Blackstone, law co-evolved with government to protect those rights
and to maintain order through property.1"9 What resulted for
Blackstone, and consequently for the common law, was a notion of
property as the "sole and despotic dominion which one man claims
and exercises over the external things of the world, in 13total
exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe. 1
What Locke and Blackstone failed to understand, at least
from Polanyi's perspective, is that the risk of the destruction of the
commons likely had less to do with the propensity of man than it
did with the propensity of markets. Polanyi argued that it was the
market that required an institutional separation of society and
economy to allow for the transformation of land, labor, and money
into commodities that could be bought, sold, or owned.13 1 Because
land, like labor and money, is a fictitious commodity, it is uniquely
vulnerable to exploitation by 132
the market and therefore requires
legal intervention to protect it.
124. Id. at 43-44.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 42.
127. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

(Chicago Press ed. 1979) (1765-1769).
128. Id. at 2-3.
129. Id. at 2.
130. Id.
131. POLANYI, supra note 114, at 43-44.
132. Id.

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2

2016]

Property,Sovereignty, and Governable Spaces

109

Whereas Locke, Blackstone, and Polanyi may disagree on the
forces driving the destruction of the commons, they agreed that it
was a necessary function of government to protect property.133 The
state played an equally active role in sustaining market expansion
in Europe, which required finding new places of accumulation and
new spaces in which to invest surplus capital in order to keep the
political economy going.3
Property proved the fundamental
mechanism by which Europe colonized the Americas: a multifaceted enterprise in search of commodities, accumulation, and
religion.3
The essential role of property in driving market expansion in
the New World embeds any understanding of property-Native or
otherwise-in a history of cultural violence.
Whether the colonist needs land as a site for the sake of the
wealth buried in it, or whether he merely wishes to constrain
the [N]ative to produce a surplus of food and raw materials, is
often irrelevant; nor does it make much difference whether the
[N]ative works under the direct supervision of the colonist or
only under some form of indirect compulsion, for in every and
any case the social
136 and cultural system of [N]ative life must be
first shattered.

133. Unlike Locke or Blackstone, Polanyi argued that the state was equally as
interested in protecting property to preserve the commons as it was with protecting
landed interests and the functioning of the free market. POLANYI, supra note 114,
at 137. In other words, property proved reciprocally generative of markets, and
vice-versa, which necessitated the development of an active state as an overarching
regulating force to mitigate the destruction of land and labor by the market. This
is what Polanyi described as the "double-movement." Id. at 136. As the market
economy continued to grow through improved trade technology and the Industrial
Revolution, it was met by an equally strong social countermovement to check
market expansion and protect against the complete annihilation of land and labor.
Id. Although the double-movement originated in society-and primarily in the
landed classes-it spurred reciprocal actions by the state to solidify the
"instruments of intervention" in the form of protective legislation. Id. at 138-39.
Applying Polanyi's double-movement to property thus positions it as a stateprotected regulation that was both necessary for organizing land and labor in terms
of commodities and the expansion of the free market, but also as an intervention to
protect against it. See id. at 138. The double movement frames the dualistic
nature of property as both an inherently destructive and protective mechanism at
its core. See id. at 137. For Polanyi, the best mechanism by which to mitigate the
destructive effects of the free market was the state. See id. at 138. However,
examining the role of property as protective and generative of the market
mechanism during colonialist expansion in North America calls Polanyi's ultimate
recommendation into question.
134. See DAVID HARVEY, SPACES OF CAPITAL: TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY
(2001).
135. See, e.g., ROBERT WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990) (describing the West's conquest
and colonization of land and people in the New World).
136. POLANYI, supra note 114, at 187-88.
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Here, Polanyi uses colonialism to demonstrate how the market
economy requires the destruction of the traditional embeddedness
of society and economy. 137 Colonialism, as an originally capitalist
endeavor, must begin by violently breaking up traditional patterns
of kinship and culture through the commodification of land and
the creation of property.
Although colonialism may not have started out as a racially
motivated project, it quickly became one. Under the guise of
progress and political disputes, colonists used race to justify the
shattering of Native lifeways by deeming them "primitive" or
"backwards., 13' To be clear, because property, government, and
the free market were born as a singular and reciprocal movement,
progress was largely viewed in terms of economic growth. This
necessitated and justified the imposition of market mechanism
through property in the colonies that was based on race. 13 9 Thus
the very idea of progress discursively produced a racial
understanding of the Native as the inferior "other., 141 "Western
notions of property ...in a colonial geography, are a white
mythology, in which the racialized figure of the savage plays a
central role., 141 The racial "othering" of Native people further
justified the hierarchy of rights afforded to settlers as "legitimate"
property owners and anchored perceived racial differences in the
landscape.
Natives' traditions and their resistance to the state-backed
market mechanism in the New World generated a system of laws
cloaked in a violent record of genocide, conquest, and racial
ordering. 142 The legal mechanism of property equally enacted and
obscured those acts of violence. Under that mechanism, the literal
taking of Native lands can be justified as a mere transfer of title;
thus, the law mutes the lived effects of disembedding people from
the land. Further, the system of rights that property does afford
reifies the racial project of "othering." The origins of property and
motivations for colonialism were largely dictated by the (White)
wealthy class of Europe, which laid the foundation for the
systematic exclusion of ethnic minorities from holding the same
property rights. 143 For Native people, even as property owners, the

137. Id.
138. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 185-86 (1951).

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 135.
Blomley, supra note 22, at 124.
See WILLIAMS, supra note 135, at 6.
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1715-
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law only offers a particular set of rights based on individual
ownership, which may efface traditional ways of using lands and
resources to maintain a collective way of life.144
In other words, property may protect Native lands and
resources from the market, but it does not protect them from the
state. Within this framework, if Native people were to use
property to counter-act encroaching interests or to offensively
assert new interests through the law alone, they would be required
to do so within the political framework of the nation-state; and
property may do more to reinforce colonial hegemonies than to
reverse them. 45 So on the one hand, this framework demonstrates
some of the broader limitations of the conventional fee-to-trust
approach to sovereignty outside reservation boundaries. On the
other, it suggests that tribes may be able to re-appropriate some
aspects of property, namely, its relational capacity to govern, to
carve out spaces of governance both within and outside the
broader framework of the state.
III. The New Model: Property, Sovereignty, and Governable
Spaces
The birth of property in the late seventeenth century marked
the epitome of colonial imperialism; the birth of the modern
nation-state, which was largely attributed to the 1648 Treaty of
Westphalia; and the nascent inklings of the modern capitalist
economic structure 4' All of these developments largely stemmed
from conflicts over land.1 47 The number of conflicts over land in
Europe was increasingly matched by the number of conflicts in
colonial nation-states in the New World. Property-violent, racist,
and persuasive-became the central medium for securing rights to
land from others.1 41 Property provided the political means for
profiting from land in the budding market economy, and territory
secured the sovereign jurisdiction of newly competing nationstates, allowing them to govern the colonies. 49

16 (1993).
144. See Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, supra note 18.
145. See Joel Wainwright & Joe Bryan, Cartography, Territory, Property:
Postcolonial Reflections on Indigenous Counter-Mapping in Nicaragua and Belize,
16 CULTURAL GEOGRAPHIES 153, 162-63 (2009).
146. See POLANYI, supra note 114, at 5-7.
147. See id.
148. See Harris, supra note 143, at 1714 ("The origins of [W]hiteness as property
lie in the parallel systems of domination of Black and Native American people out
of which were created racially contingent forms of property and property rights.").
149. ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY, supra note 115, at 329.
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Before one can understand how property can function as a
tool of governance, it is important to disambiguate property, space,
place, and territory. "Property," as discussed earlier,1 0 refers to
the legal means by which states ordered social relations spatially:
by disembodying land from man, by excluding others from that
land, and by ultimately transforming land and resources into
commodities for sale on the free market.1 1 Space and place help
define or interpret these relationships. Although the precise
meanings of "space" and "place" are the source of much scholarly
debate among geographers, this Article treats "place" as a physical
location that can be interchangeable with land, and "space" as
physical or non-physical spheres of relations.1 2 These concepts
constantly overlap both experientially and discursively.
"Territory," on the other hand, embodies a uniquely political
connotation that is inherently related to, by incorporating concepts
of space and place, yet distinct from, property.1 53 By the end of the
scientific revolution, budding nation-states employed territory as
the primary political technology to define and extend their
power. 15 4 Territory refers to a geographic area made legible, and
therefore governable, through the technical and juridical metrics
of the broader state. 15 5 Because territory was born as a political

150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See, e.g.,
EDWARD W. SOJA, ASS'N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS, THE POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION OF SPACE: COMMISSION ON COLLEGE GEOGRAPHY RESOURCE PAPER
No. 8, at 9-10 (1971).
152. See John A. Agnew, Space and Place, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF
GEOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE 316 (John Agnew & David N. Livingstone eds., 2011)
(examining the relationship between the concepts of space and place "[g]iven that
both space and place are about the 'where' of things and their relative invocation
has usually signaled different understandings of what 'where' means"); Stuart
Elden, Land, Terrain, Territory, 34 PROGRESS HUM. GEOGRAPHY 799 (2010)
[hereinafter Elden, Land, Terrain, Territory].
153. Elden, Land, Terrain, Territory, supra note 152, at 804-05 (reviewing the
etymological and political-economic influences which create a conceptual link
between "property" and "territory").
154. ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY, supra note 115, at 322-28 (discussing the
extension of the state in the seventeenth century through new cartographic
technologies which defined territory); see also David Delaney, Geographies of
Judgment: Legal Reasoning and Geopolitics of Race, 1836-1948, at 1-2 (1995)
[hereinafter Delaney, Geographies of Judgment] (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Wisconsin Madison) (on file with the University of Wisconsin Library)
("[Ifn theory, geographies are inextricably involved in the constitution of social
power... and... political actors themselves are aware of the spatial constitution
of power relations.").
155. See Bryan, supra note 111, at 40 ("[T]he practice of producing and using
maps involves negotiating a spatially complex terrain shaped by multiple and
overlapping forms of territory and authority. Insofar as mapping involves
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technology for sovereign state-making, it is largely understood as
the spatial mechanism by which sovereigns extend their power
over people vis-A-vis control over space.5 6 Territory-and, thus,
sovereignty-can be established with property, but it does not
have to be, and property can exist within territory in multiple
forms.
Thus, property and the development of the modern nationstate are reciprocal and mutually generative of the legal
interventions that order social relationships according to space,
create territories, and discipline territorial expressions to facilitate
governance. The relationship between property, territory, and
governance has been the source of a wide range of inquiries in both
law and geography.5 7 This Article next looks at how property
functions as a tool of governance from the perspective of CLG as it
relates to the model of governable spaces of inclusion and
exclusion.
A.

Propertyas Spaces of Inclusion and Exclusion

Although property grants a variety of rights to owners, and
although the right to exclude is tempered by conflicting rights of
non-owners and by legislation, the right to exclude weighs heavily
movement through this terrain, it engages multiple spatialities that inform
assessments of the potential for legal recognition and critically awareness of its
constraints.").
156. ELDEN, THE BIRTH OF TERRITORY, supra note 115, at 283-85.
157. See, e.g., DELANEY, THE SPATIAL, THE LEGAL, AND THE PRAGMATICS OF
WORLD-MAKING, supra note 20, at 8 ("This is our topic: world and space; space and
meaning; meaning and experience; experience, power, and embodiment, as bound,
and unbound, through what we call law."); ROSE, supra note 24, at 34 ("Central to
modern governmental thought has been a territorialization of national spaces:
states, countries, populations, societies."); Blomley, Law, Property, and the
Geography of Violence, supra note 22, at 121 (arguing "that there is an intrinsic and
consequential geography to law's violence as it relates to private property"); Bryan,
supra note 111, at 40 ("[M]apping as practice provides a means of understanding
how indigenous political understandings of space are shaped relationally by
multiple and overlapping forms of territory and authority."); Sara Keenan, Property
as Governance: Time, Space and Belonging in Australia's Northern Territory
Intervention, 76 MODERN L. REV. 464, 464 (2013) [hereinafter Keenan, Property as
Governance] ("[P]roperty is productive of temporal and spatial order and so can
function as a tool of governance."); Sarah Keenan, Subversive Property:Reshaping
Malleable Spaces of Belonging, 19 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 423, 424 (2010) [hereinafter
Keenan, Subversive Property] ("[A] spatialized understanding of property [can be
used for] an alternative political agenda for property."); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. 453, 454 (2002) (exploring "the nature of property from the point of view of
how property rights are defined and enforced"); Wainright & Bryan, supra note
145, at 153 (calling "for a closer examination of the role of the law in the emergence
of indigenous mapping through a discussion of the ways in which maps are used to
advance legal claims to land").
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on the public consciousness and daily defines the contours of social
relationships. Private property owners can use lethal force on
uninvited people entering their homes; city councils can pass
ordinances to prohibit homeless people from living on city-owned
streets; the federal government can fine Native people for
collecting berries in national forests.18
The law codifies
hierarchies of rights based on the principle of exclusion and orders
what certain people can or cannot do in certain places. In the
words of one scholar, "property is productive of temporal and
spatial order and so can function as a tool of governance.""'
Property grants individuals the right to exclude others from
spaces, relationships, and things. The state legitimates individual
property rights and, therefore, the rights of individual property
owners to exclude others. The right to exclude diffuses the power
of the sovereign through individual rights holders to maintain
control and facilitate governance.160 The law does not govern the
juridical subject as a threshold for asserting a political voice, but
rather it governs the subversive embodiment of complex and
interrelated systems of power, which are both promulgated and
produced through the disciplinary mechanisms of modern
institutions. 161 The law is a deep-rooted structural technique for
expanding disciplinary control over individual bodies and, in turn,
it facilitates the management of people as a group. Property, as a
function of the law, consolidates multiple understandings of the
world into a single narrative that is used to order society. 162
Property scholars, however, often place the right to exclude
on the opposite end of the property spectrum from the broader
systems of governance actuated by the state. 16 3 Whereas the right
to exclude limits what can be done, the state, broadly construed,
can also regulate property to prescribe how people use certain
places or things. Thus, property also governs as a space of
inclusion. It operates through individuals as a rubric for mass

158. For discussions of the right to exclude in these and other contexts, see THE
LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER, supra note 20.

159. Keenan, Property as Governance, supra note 157, at 464.
160. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION: LECTURES AT

THE COLLEGE DE FRANCE 1977-1978 (Michel Senellart et al. eds., Graham Burchell
trans., 2007).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 157, at 455 ("[E]xclusion and governance are
strategies that are at the poles of a continuum of methods of measurement, which
we can add to the more familiar continuum from private property through the
commons to open access.").
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normalization. "There is not the legal age, the disciplinary age,
and then the age of security"; rather, the "technologies" or
"apparatuses" of security arrange society in such a way that what
we do, or do not do, is neutral and normalized.164 Law (the right to
exclude) tells us what must not be done, discipline (regulation)
tells us what must be done, and 65security (the broader state)
regulates the population as a whole.
Viewing exclusion and regulation on two ends of a property
spectrum, however, fails to recognize that property is necessarily
both. Property simultaneously excludes and includes in order to
mediate the market, to legitimate the broader state, and to
contravene all of it.6 The double-movement of property creates
spaces of inclusive exclusion to govern both as a way to diffuse
power and discipline individual bodies, and as a way to establish
an overarching framework of regulation. 7 The modern state
actuates these relationships of control materially through
property.
Property operates as a tool of governance by
simultaneously including and excluding people and organizing
their relationships between each other and with place. In this
way, property can be considered a spatially contingent
relationship of belonging.6
As one commentator has noted:
"Property thus has the power to govern beyond the direct control
that a subject exerts over her object. The space that property
produces governs the conceptual, social,
and physical shape of the
'
1 69
various elements which constitute it.

164. FOUCAULT, supra note 160, at 8.
165. Id.
166. See POLANYI, supra note 114, at 36-42.
167. See Keenan, Subversive Property,supra note 157.
168. See id.
169. Keenan, Property as Governance, supra note 157, at 490-91. Consider
Sarah Keenan's recent work on Australia's 2007 Northern Territory National
Emergency Response Act (NTNERA) as an example.
Keenan, Property as
Governance, supra note 157. NTNERA granted the federal government long-term
leases over aboriginal lands so the government could enact legislation to combat
the alleged widespread sexual abuse of children. Id. at 465-67. The government
used this power to ban alcohol, mandate income management for welfare
recipients, install anti-pornography filters on public computers, and more. Id. The
curious aspect of these leases was that the federal government never actually
exercised its right to exclusive possession; this fact thereby challenged the
dominant way of understanding the use of property as centering on the propertied
subject's right to exclude. Id. at 464-65. Instead, "what was at stake in the
contested leases was not so much possession of land, as it was the time and space of
belonging that property produces." Id. at 465. In this way, property functions as a
spatially, temporally, and socially contingent tool of governance that functions by
indirectly producing spaces of belonging and exclusion. Id.
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Sovereignty as Governable Spaces

As demonstrated in case law, legal scholarship, and
geography scholarship, explanations about how property functions
as a tool of governance have traditionally focused on the way in
which government thought is anchored in land to establish
sovereign control. The assumption that landed property is always
necessary for generating governable spaces limits attempts to
expand governance to the fee-to-trust approach to off-reservation
sovereignty claims.
However, a truly relational and spatial
understanding of property deemphasizes the conventional focus on
the propertied subject and accompanying rights of exclusion
according to the law, and it adopts a more holistic understanding
of property. If property functions as a tool of governance by
creating spaces of inclusive exclusion, then property is spatially
and temporally malleable and can create new spaces that may
exceed the significance of reservation boundaries as a limit on
tribal nation-building.
Nikolas Rose's concept of governable space, 171 later adopted by
Michael Watts, 171 proposes a model that provides an alternative to
the fee title approach to sovereignty. Governable spaces are
produced by the multiple interactions between identity, land, and
resources.1' These spaces are contingent on the territorializing, or
anchoring of government thought and practice to an identifiable
parcel of land, and they are equally constrained and morphed 1on
7 3
multiple scales by the political economy of resource development.
These spaces are not just reflective of the economic or legal
framework of resource development; they are also generative
of
17 4
diverse and contested "forms of rule, conduct, and imagining.,
Multiple factors contribute to the formation of different types
of governable spaces, namely, political economy, legal complex,
cultural traditions, and ethnic identities.1 7 5 But a traditional
176
understanding of governable spaces requires a visible land base.
The specific amalgamations of territory, subject identity, and rule
leads to different group geographies, be it physical, social, or

170. See Rose & Valverde, supra note 24, at 549.
171. Watts, Antinomies of Community, supra note 24, at 195.
172. Id. at 199 ("[G]overnable spaces [are] differing sorts of community ... in
which differing sorts of identities, forms of rule and territory come into play.").
173. Watts, The Sinister PoliticalLife of Community, supra note 24, at 107-08.
174. Watts, Antinomies of Community, supra note 24, at 205.
175. Id. at 200.
176. Id.
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ideological. 177 Such amalgamations do not just reflect institutional
techniques of power, but generate new sites that produce different
ways of being and seeing the world.1 7' Tools of governance define
spaces where political ideologies and personal conduct are
anchored to a recognizable land base and control population vis-Avis geospatially discernable districts.
In this way, property
heterogeneously territorializes control over groups to create
governable enclaves dependent on conceptions of space and time
prescribed through the institutional, disciplinary, and legal
techniques of governance.
Although the governable-spaces approach originally analyzed
specific interactions with land, the theoretical underpinnings of
the model suggest broader applications. Imbuing the concept of
governable spaces with the idea that property has the power to
govern beyond the propertied subject suggests that property can
be used to create new spaces of governance that are not contingent
on fee rights to land. Territorial jurisdiction, as a symbol for
sovereign governance, is "simultaneously a material technology, a
built environment[,] and a discursive intervention. 1 79 In other
words, other types of legal rights relating to property in land that
fall short of fee title can generate governable spaces across,
without consideration of, or in spite of landed boundaries
delimited by fee-title ownership. More broadly, the spatio-legal
effects of property can create governable spaces that are purely
social, altogether negating the role of land as a necessity for
expressing tribal sovereignty.
C. Governable Spaces and Off-Reservation Claims to
Sovereignty
From a legal standpoint, alternatives to the fee-to-trust
approach to asserting offensive claims to sovereignty over offreservation lands fall within one of three general-though often
overlapping-categories: usufructuary rights, contract rights to
participate in the governance of such lands, and statutory rights to
be consulted regarding their development.
In each case, the
assertion of legal rights exceeds the normative framework of the
law and generates new spaces of governance for tribes to express

177. See Watts, The Sinister PoliticalLife of Community, supra note 24.
178. See id.
179. Richard Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), in THE LEGAL
GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER, AND SPACE 200, 201 (David Delaney et al. eds.,

2001).
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their roles as sovereigns. This Article focuses specifically on issues
of resource management as a proxy for evaluating the governable
spaces model to off-reservation sovereignty claims.1'
1.

Usufructuary rights

The governable spaces model demonstrates how tribes can
expand tribal sovereignty without acquiring fee title by
establishing usufructuary rights through resource management,
i.e., by asserting off-reservation hunting and fishing treaty
rights,181 and through other common-law property rights as nonowners.8 2 By asserting property rights that fall short of fee-title
ownership in land, usufructuary rights create new spaces of
governance by reordering socio-spatial relationships.
This
approach does not just expand sovereignty for sovereignty's sake,
but also creates a framework for nation-building that works to
ease traditionally contentious relationships with non-Native
neighbors.
When many tribes ceded their territory to the United States,
they negotiated the right to continuously hunt and fish on their
aboriginal territories outside reservation boundaries.1 3 Courts
have affirmed these rights in varying capacities; for example, the
Court has held that tribes have the right to access lands held in
fee by private owners and the right to manage tribe members' use
of resources from that land.1 4 In the landmark case United States
v. Winans, the Court held that the 1855 Treaty with the Yakimas
guaranteed the continued right of the Tribe to fish at its "usual
and accustomed places. ' 185 The Winans Court ruled that a treaty
establishing rights to access off-reservation fisheries created an
easement over private lands, which protected the Tribe's rights
180. Other potential applications and implications for further scholarship are
addressed in Part V.
181. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the
Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1017-18 (2008) (describing
the interaction of tribal hunting and fishing rights guaranteed by treaty and by
state regulations).
182. See Carpenter, supra note 18, at 1091 ("In historical and contemporary
times, nonowners have had rights and owners have had obligations [at common
law].").
183. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) ("[Indians] were
given 'the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places."'); United States
v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the rights established by
a treaty with the Nez Perce Tribe); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231, 232 (9th Cir.
1974) (citing the Treaty with the Yakimas, art. III, 12 Stat. 951, 953 (1855), as
granting the tribe the "exclusive right of taking fish").
184. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381-82.
185. Id. at 381.
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from underlying changes in property ownership or use."'
In
Winans, this meant preventing non-Indian holders of a state
license on private land from operating a fish wheel that interfered
with the Tribe's right to take fish.187
From a legal perspective, off-reservation treaty rights provide
two primary non-fee means for tribes to participate in governing
hunting, fishing, and gathering outside traditional reservation
boundaries. The tribe with the treaty right has the power to
regulate member hunting and fishing off-reservation as part of its
sovereign authority to self-govern.8
This provides tribes with an
actionable right to prevent private development that may interfere
with a tribe's ability to hunt, fish, or gather on the off-reservation
lands specified in the treaty. 9 Although tribal authority to
manage treaty-secured hunting and fishing resources on offreservation lands is notably limited, 9 from a CLG perspective,
usufruct treaty rights allow tribes to move beyond traditional
limitations of governance over land by reordering social
relationships.
Even without off-reservation treaty rights, tribes may be able
to assert certain property rights as non-owners in order to exercise
some regulatory control outside reservation boundaries.191 For
example, tribes who have continuously used and occupied certain
resources on federal lands may be able to assert common-law
property rights to continue to use and occupy those resources
through prescriptive easements. If tribes can establish "actual,
open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted" possession of
the property for a statutorily determined period of time, they can

186. Id. at 384.
187. Id. at 382.
188. See Settler, 507 F.2d at 241-42.
189. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Alexander, 440
F. Supp. 553, 556 (D. Or. 1977); see also Lindsay Halm, PuttingFlesh on the Bones
of United States v. Winans: Private Party Liability Under Treaties That Reserve
Actual Fish for the Tribal Taking, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1181, 1191 (2004) ("Tribes
secure injunctive and declaratory relief in federal court to defend their treaty
fishing rights against governmental and private projects that, if developed, would
interfere with the exercise of fishing rights.").
190. The federal government may abrogate tribes' treaty rights; states may
regulate off-reservation hunting, fishing, or gathering rights for the purpose of
conservation; and treaty rights do not reserve a right to directly regulate nonmember resource-use. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 18.04(3), at
1178-84 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW].

191. Carpenter, supra note 18, at 1092; see also Mary Christina Wood, The
Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (PartII): Asserting a Sovereign Servitude
To Protect Habitat of Imperiled Species, 25 VT. L. REV. 355, 359 (2001).
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assert a right to a prescriptive easement to continue to use that
land.192 Although prescriptive easements are mostly utilized
against private property owners, 43 U.S.C § 1068 establishes a
narrow exception for actionable possession claims against the
federal government. 11 3 Like with off-reservation treaty rights, a
prescriptive easement may allow tribes to assert some forms of
regulatory control over resource use by prohibiting
certain
14
activities which interfere with their usage rights.
Usufruct rights broadly operate around a theory of access to
land and resources, which highlights the spatial and relational
aspects of property as a tool of governance. In the case of treaty
rights, the right to hunt and fish on ceded lands outside
reservations is held "in common" with non-Indians.1" In the case
of servitudes, Native people retain a non-possessory right to access
lands owned in fee by non-Natives. These legal rights overlap
where Natives and non-Natives access the same places. Using the
landscape in accordance with legal rights concomitantly generates
the social space that upholds them.1"6 Thus, such rights may
equally create new governable spaces for tribes to participate in
governance outside reservation boundaries, while simultaneously
cultivating better relationships among Native and non-Native
groups.
Off-reservation usufruct rights can be the impetus for
negotiations among multiple stakeholders, including tribes;
private landholders; and state, federal, or international
governments, outside tribally owned lands. 1 7 For example, U.S.
192. Carpenter, supra note 18, at 1095 (quoting United States v. Platt, 730 F.
Supp. 318, 323 (D. Ariz. 1990)).
193. Id. at 1098 n.234.
194. Id. at 1096.
195. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378 (1905).
196. See Blomley, Landscapes of Property,supra note 103.
197. See, e.g., Peter Erlinder, Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa: 19th
Century U.S. Treaty-Guaranteed UsufructuaryProperty Rights, the Foundationfor
21st Century Indigenous Sovereignty, 33 LAW & INEQ. 143, 206-07 (2015)
(discussing state-tribal co-management of resources protected by usufructuary
rights); Peter Erlinder, Treaty-GuaranteedUsufructuary Rights: Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians Ten Years On, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10921, 10922 (2011) (same); Ed Goodman, Protecting Habitat for Off-Reservation
Tribal Hunting and FishingRights: Tribal Comanagement as a Reserved Right, 30
ENVTL. L. 279, 349 (2000) (noting that "four Indian tribes, three states, and two
federal agencies" jointly developed the Columbia River Fisheries Management
Plan); Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Treaties and the
Survival of the Great Lakes, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1285, 1287 ("Indian treaty
jurisprudence [should be integrated] into the strategy for saving the Great Lakes.");
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tribes entered into dozens of treaties with the federal government,
ceding title to millions of acres of lands in the Great Lakes region,
but maintaining usufruct treaty rights to continue to access the
same places where they had hunted, fished, and lived since time
immemorial.198
As state and federal efforts to preserve the
environmental integrity of the Great Lakes continue to fail, tribes
and Canadian First Nations people have begun discussing
cooperative ways to preserve the traditional watershed by
leveraging their usufruct rights as the juridical hook for
negotiations with non-Native stakeholders. 9 As a result of these
discussions, tribal and First Nations people drafted the Tribal and
First Nations Great Lakes Water Accord and succeeded in having
some of their rights to the Great Lakes incorporated into the
compact regulating use of those waters. 20 Although the compact
has arguably not yet incorporated the full extent of tribal rights,0 1
this sphere of negotiation demonstrates how usufruct rights
generate new governable spaces for tribes to participate in
governing land they do not own in fee. Furthermore, this model
advances better relationships and better management. In the
words of one environmental manager: "inter-governmental and
other partnerships allow the parties to achieve public benefits that
no one partner could achieve alone.20 2
2.

Contract rights

Tribes can generate governable spaces by asserting contract
rights to manage off-reservation land and resources. Two ways
tribes have done this are (1) contractual co-management
agreements with surrounding
state, local,
and federal
governments,2 0 3 and (2) conservation easements with land trusts.
Eric Smith, Some Thoughts on Comanagement, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y 763, 767 (2008) (describing various models of co-management between
Indigenous people and state actors).
198. Singel & Fletcher, supra note 197, at 1291.
199. Id. at 1295-96.
200. See Jacqueline Phelan Hand, Protecting the World's Largest Body of Fresh
Water: The Often Overlooked Role of Indian Tribes' Co-Management of the Great
Lakes, 47 NAT. RES. J. 815 (2007) (discussing in detail tribal participation in the
compact and in other agreements regulating the Great Lakes environment).
201. Id. at 833-34.
202. The Great Lakes Regional Collaboration Strategy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Water Res. & the Env't of the H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure,
109th Cong. 159 (2006) (statement of James E. Zorn, Executive Administrator of
the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission).
203. Mary Ann King, Co-Management or Contracting? Agreements Between
Native American Tribes and the U.S. National Park Service Pursuant to the 1994
Tribal Self-Governance Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 475, 481 (2007) ("[T]ribes may
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Co-management describes a system of shared responsibility
between the state and federal governments and tribal resourceusers.0 4 "Co-management may offer a pathway for resource users
to obtain a proprietary share in the authority and decision-making
powers that underwrite management.""'
Contractual comanagement describes the best practices for codifying a shared
management system, where the specific rights and responsibilities
are delegated through a legally binding document giving rise to
potential causes of action in the occasion of breach. 6 Although
the actual efficacy of co-management agreements at improving
resource management regimes remains contested, 0 7 contract
rights securing tribal management roles generate new spaces of
inclusion for tribes to participate in governance outside
reservation boundaries.
The utility of contracting for governance through comanagement agreements is especially relevant in the context of
managing resources on federal lands. Under the Tribal Self
20 8
Governance Act (TSGA),
federal agencies can enter into Public
Law 93-638 contracts with tribes to manage projects on federal

negotiate on a government-to-government basis with the [National Park Service],
but the substantive programs look more like contracting than co-management.").
204. Fikret Berkes, Evolution of Co-Management: Role of Knowledge Generation,
Bridging Organizations and Social Learning, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1692, 1692
(2009).
205. Alfonso Peter Castro & Eric Nielsen, Indigenous People and CoManagement: Implications for Conflict Management, 4 ENVTL. SCI. & POL'Y 229,
231 (2001).
206. Alison Rieser, Property Rights and Ecosystem Management in U.S.
Fisheries:Contractingfor the Commons?, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 813, 827-28 (1997).
207. Compare, e.g., Berkes, supra note 204 (analyzing the ways in which social
learning and bridging organizations can make co-management agreements more
effective), and Castro & Nielsen, supra note 205, at 231 ("Although [the]
stakeholders [in the co-management agreements] may hold different interests, the
fundamental assumption is that sharing authority and decision making will
enhance the process of resource management, making it more responsive to a range
of needs."), with PAUL NADASDY, HUNTERS AND BUREAUCRATS: POWER,
KNOWLEDGE, AND ABORIGINAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST YUKON 1-2
(2003) (arguing that, in Canada, "land claims and co-management are something of
a mixed blessing for First Nations people" because they require First Nations
people to "learn completely new and uncharacteristic ways of speaking and
thinking" and to restructure their communities to become more bureaucratic in
order to act as sovereign states alongside the Canadian government), and King,
supra note 203, at 481 (criticizing the National Park Service's interpretation of the
Tribal Self-Governance Act (TSGA) of 1994, 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa-hh, as "narrow,"
and stating that, consequently, "[i]t is not clear that the TSGA provides a sovereign
nation with any more programmatic control and decision-making authority than a
contractor").
208. 25 U.S.C. §§ 458aa-hh (2012).
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lands. 29 There are two primary ways tribes can participate in
public land management under the TSGA. 210 "First, [the TSGA]
establishes a government-to-government negotiation process that
obligates agencies to negotiate," even though they are not
required, as the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) is, to enter into
agreements with tribes. 11
The second way the TSGA expands tribes' ability to manage
public land is by allowing them to exercise congressionally
delegated federal authority through Annual Funding Agreements
(AFAs). AFAs are instruments negotiated pursuant to the TSGA
that govern the transfer of federal programs and funds to tribes.
Although the delegation of federal authority to tribes is not new,
the TSGA may, for the first time, permit the delegation of
authority over federal programs and federal land.
AFAs are regulatory agreements that allocate federal funds
to tribes to implement federal programs on federal lands, 3
thereby extending tribal regulatory control over resource
management outside reservations to encompass federal lands. At
the very least, although the TSGA neither establishes nor reflects
a possessory right to manage natural resources on federal lands, it
does mandate that tribes be able to participate in decisions and
manage programs of "special geographic, historical, or cultural
significance. 2 4 Thus, the TSGA expands a tribe's role as a
sovereign through governable space.
In addition, new synergies between tribes and land trusts
demonstrate how asserting contract rights to manage conservation
easements can generate governable spaces without acquiring fee
rights in land to expand sovereign authority.2 1 "[A] land trust is a
non-profit organization that, as all or part of its mission, actively
works to acquire land or conservation easements for the purpose of
conserving natural, recreational, scenic, historical[,] or other
productive resources. 21 6
Conservation easements are legally
binding agreements between the property owner and a land trust

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See King, supra note 203, at 476.
Id. at 477-78.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 478.
25 U.S.C. § 458cc(c) (2012).
For an in-depth discussion about relationships between tribes and land

trusts, see BETH ROSE MIDDLETON, TRUST IN THE LAND: NEW DIRECTIONS IN TRIBAL

CONSERVATION (2011).
216. Marc Campopiano, The Land Trust Alliance's New Accreditation Program,
33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 897, 902 (2006).
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that restrict use in accordance with the goals of the land trust in
exchange for certain tax and zoning incentives.217
With
conservation easements, title remains with the landowner where
development rights are transferred to the conservator.
"Easements are often referred to as 'partial interests' in land
because they do not transfer the property itself to the conservator
but merely transfer the right to enforce prohibitions against future
'
development."218
Conservation easements secure the rights for the
conservator to govern the property as a matter of contract without
disturbing the underlying fee title. Thus, they are not exactly real
property rights, and are not exactly easements, but are rather a
statutorily created anomaly 19 that Carol Rose would describe as
"property on the outside, contract (or norms) on the inside."20
Tribes can utilize this framework for expanding sovereignty by
contracting with or creating their own land trusts to administer or
set the terms of conservation easements outside reservation
boundaries. 21
This model could be particularly useful for conceptualizing
ways for federally unrecognized tribes to engage in nationbuilding. Although tribal sovereignty is an inherent right that is
not delegated by the United States, but rather predates it,"' the
federal government only acknowledges the sovereignty of tribes
that have been federally recognized.2 3 This incongruity all but
moots the utility of the fee-to-trust approach to expanding tribal
sovereignty for unrecognized tribes. If a tribe were to purchase
land in fee on the open market, it would be ineligible to apply to
217. James Boyd, Kathryn Caballero & R. David Simpson, The Law and
Economics of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement
Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 215 (2000).
218. Id.
219. Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land
Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73
DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (1996).
220. Rieser, supra note 206, at 828 n.78 (quoting Carol M. Rose, Predicting
Property, Address at the American Association of Law Schools Conference on
Property Law 34-35 (June 7, 1997)).
221. For a full account of how tribes are using conservation easements to extend
governance outside reservation boundaries, see MIDDLETON, supra note 215.
222. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 (2014) ("Unless
and 'until Congress acts, the tribes retain' their historic sovereign authority."
(citations omitted)); id. at 2039 ("Indian tribes exercise sovereignty subject to the
will of the Federal Government."); Singer, supra note 16, at 35.
223. Harry S. Jackson III, The Incomplete Loom: Exploring the Checkered Past
and Present of American Indian Sovereignty, 64 RUTGERs L. REV. 471, 476, 490
(2012) (noting that a tribe may be recognized by treaty, "by Act of Congress," "by
the administrative procedures set forth in part 83 of the Code of Federal
Regulations," or "by a decision of a United States court." (citations omitted)).

2016]

Property,Sovereignty, and Governable Spaces

125

have the land brought into trust under the IRA if it could not
prove it was federally recognized in 1934.224
Furthermore,
unrecognized tribes lack standing to sue over any initial sale of
lands that may have been in violation of the Indian NonIntercourse Act.
In either case, it would be exceedingly difficult
for an unrecognized tribe to purchase land in fee, or to nullify fee
title for illegally purchased land, and thus be able to assert the full
spectrum of sovereign rights in terms of tribal governance.
Consider the recent work of the federally unrecognized Amah
Mutsun Band of Ohlone People of Northern California as an
example of using contractual rights to generate governable space
to engage in sovereign nation-building. The Amah Mutsun have
occupied the greater Monterey Bay area for thousands of years,
predating European contact, and are the living descendants of the
Mutsun- and Awaswas -speaking peoples. 226 The Amah Matsun,
who have no recognized land base, are recognized by state and
municipal governments, but not by the federal government, and
they have therefore struggled to find ways to participate in
preserving their cultural life-ways and environments. 27 In a
landmark agreement, the Amah Mutsun Band of Oholone People
partnered with the Sempervirens Fund, California's oldest land
trust, to take control over a conservation easement of ninety-six
acres between Davenport and Pescadero on the Pacific coast of
Northern California.
The ninety-six acres include several
culturally significant archeological sites and an ecosystem of
marine terraces that is currently threatened by encroaching
coastal shrubs and Douglas firs.229 Local conservation groups have
recognized the value of Amah Mutsun traditional knowledge and
the tribe's linguistic history of the area to restore ecosystemic

224. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 382 (2009).
225. Mark D. Myers, Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes in the United States,
12 STAN. L. & POL'YREV. 271, 276 (2001) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 177).
226. Jason Hoppin, Amah Mutsun Tribe Lands First Land Preservation
Agreement,
SANTA
CRUZ
SENTINEL
(Aug.
22,
2013,
12:01
AM),
http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/general-news/20130822/amah-mutsun-tribe-land
s-first-land-preservation-agreement.
227. Id.
228. Sempervirens Fund Partnerswith the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band, Costanoa
Lodge To Protect Land Near Big Basin Redwoods and A7io Nuevo State Parks,
SEMPERVIRENS FUND, https://sempervirens.org/sempervirens-fund-partners-withthe-amah-mutsun-tribal-band-costanoa-lodge-to-protect-land-near-big-basin-redwo
ods-and-ano-nuevo-state-parks/
(last visited Oct. 20, 2015) [hereinafter
Sempervirens Fund Partnerswith the Amah Matsun Tribal Band].
229. Id.
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balance to the land. 230 As a result, the Tribe and the Sempervirens
Fund (with the support of a grant from the Christensen Fund)
contracted for the American Land Conservancy to transfer the
conservatorship, along with $43,000, to the Amah Mutsun Tribe. 31
The underlying fee title to the land will remain in the hands of the
landowner, Costanoa Lodge, but the Tribe will serve as the sole
conservator-retaining the right determine how the land will be
used.
The Amah Mutsun case study demonstrates an alternative to
the fee approach to expanding tribal sovereignty by generating
governable spaces through contract, and deemphasizes the role
property rights in land play in determining the extent of tribal
sovereignty. The Tribe has no actual property rights in the ninetysix acres, but rather, it has Tribe-acquired contract rights to
administer the easement and, therefore, manage and restrict how
the property is used. This approach does not necessarily allow the
Tribe to assert every aspect of sovereignty that a federally
recognized tribe would be able to, such as immunity from suit.
However, acquiring rights to the easement allows the Tribe to
generate a new governable space without owning the land in fee.
Additionally, under this system, cooperation between Natives and
Non-Natives fosters better relationships among those living in the
community, which suggests a more sustainable model of nationbuilding.
3.

Consultation Proceedings

Tribes also generate governable spaces to assert themselves
as sovereigns without acquiring title in fee by leveraging
consultation proceedings. The federal land laws of the 1970s
created new environmental and cultural preservation laws that
included provisions mandating consultation between tribes and
federal agencies.
"By the 1990s, all of the major federal land
management agencies such as the Bureau of Land Management,
National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service, and U.S. Fish and
Wildlife
Service were promoting federal-tribal ecosystem
management approaches. 3 4 The 1997 Secretarial Order American

230. Id.
231. Hoppin, supra note 226.
232. Sempervirens Fund Partners with the Amah Matsun Tribal Band, supra
note 228.
233. David Suzuki & Peter Knudston, Ecosystem Co-Management Plans: A
Sound Approach or a Threat to Tribal Rights?, 27 VT. L. REV. 421, 436 (2003).
234. Id.
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Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-TribalTrust Responsibility, and the
Endangered Species Act required federal agencies to consult tribes
about decisions affecting their lands and resources, and
encouraged co-management agreements between tribal and
federal agencies to protect endangered species and their
habitats.235 In 2000, Executive Order 13175, Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, called for regular
and meaningful consultation and collaboration with tribal officials
when developing policies that would impact tribes.236
Under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), for
example, tribes retain the right to "consult with any Indian tribe
or Native Hawaiian organization that attaches religious and
cultural significance to [impacted] propert[ies] ."7 The NHPA was
initially enacted in 1966238 to protect historical resources and
information about the past by managing "federally owned,
administered, or controlled historic resources in a spirit of
stewardship for the inspiration and benefit of present and future
generations. 2 3 9 The 1966 NHPA attempted to achieve these goals
primarily through § 106, which requires federal agencies to
address the impact of federal projects on historic properties that
are either listed, or eligible to be listed 40 on the National Historic
Register. The meaning of consultation in § 106 proceedings,
however, has been construed narrowly and generally does not
require that the tribe consent to a particular project; rather, the
statute requires federal agencies to go through the "procedure" of
consultation-which has little substantive impact.2 4 1

235. OFFICE OF THE NATIVE AM. LIAISON, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVS.,
SECRETARIAL ORDER 3206: AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL RIGHTS, FEDERAL-TRIBAL
TRUST RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1997).

236. Exec. Order No. 13175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249, "Consultation and
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments" (Nov. 6, 2000).
237. 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b) (2014).
238. National Historic Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1966)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2012)).
239. National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470-1(3) (2012).
240. Id. § 106.
241. See, e.g., Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Warwick Sewer Auth., 334 F.3d 161,
166-67 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding that the sewage authority fulfilled § 106
consultation requirements where historic property was not previously identified);
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752, 755 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that § 106
consultation proceedings are procedural and "impose[ no substantive standards on
agencies"); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 805 (9th
Cir. 1999) (noting that § 106 consultation requires agencies to "stop, look, and
listen," but not to reach an agreement with a tribe); see also 36 C.F.R. § 800.3
(2012) (outlining the initiation of the § 106 process).
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Nonetheless, tribes have achieved success in leveraging
NHPA consultations to derail federal projects that may
deleteriously affect off-reservation resources. For example, in
Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. United
States Department of the Interior, the Quechan Tribe sued the
Department of the Interior to enjoin a solar project on federally
owned land after the Bureau of Land Management failed to
properly consult the Tribe under NHPA and various other federal
laws.2 42 The court enjoined the project, finding that the BLM had
failed to properly and timely consult the Tribe, which divested the
Tribe of a procedural right under the law, and that allowing the
project to proceed would irreparably harm "hundreds of known
historical sites on the land [to many, if not most of which,] the
Tribe attaches cultural and religious significance. 243
In addition to statutorily mandated consultation proceedings,
new developments in international law provide another legal hook
for generating governable spaces to expand tribal sovereignty.
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples recognizes the right to free, prior, and informed consent in
decisions that may affect the sociocultural life, lands, or resources
of Indigenous peoples.2 44 The "free, prior, and informed consent"
("FPIC") language appears in Articles 10 (relocation), 45 11
(cultural property), 46 19 (legislative or administrative decision

242. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation v. U.S. Dep't of the
Interior, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1106-07 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
243. Id. at 1120.
244. G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). International Labour Organization Convention No. 169
similarly guarantees the right to consent "whenever consideration is being given to
legislative or administrative measures which may affect them directly."
International Labour Organisation [ILO], Convention ConcerningIndigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, ILO Convention No. 169, art. 6 (June 27,
1989).
245. G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, art. 10 (Sept. 13, 2007) ("Indigenous peoples shall not be
forcibly removed from their lands or territories. No relocation shall take place
without the free, prior[,] and informed consent of the indigenous peoples concerned
and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible, with the
option of return.").
246. Id. at art. 11 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize
their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect
and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as
archaeological and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and
visual and performing arts and literature .... States shall provide redress through
effective mechanisms, which may include restitution, developed in conjunction with
indigenous peoples, with respect to their cultural, intellectual, religious and
spiritual property taken without their free, prior[,] and informed consent or in
violation of their laws, traditions and customs.").
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making) ,247

29

(environmental

protection) ,248

30

129
(military

activity)2 and 32 (development).2
Although the exact meaning,
content, and processes for achieving affirmative consent are still
developing in international
and domestic
forums, the
internationally recognized right to FPIC provides another tool for
tribes and other Indigenous groups to extend their roles as
sovereigns through governable spaces. 2511
For example, in Sarayaku v. Ecuador, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) held that, during a tenyear saga of environmentally unsound oil exploration, the
Ecuadorian government failed to properly consult the Kichwa
Sarayaku People, which violated the Tribe's right to property and
the accompanying rights to personal life, personal integrity, and
culture.
In addition to monetary and remedial damages, the
IACHR ordered that Ecuador incorporate the right to free, prior,
and informed consent into domestic law in a way that "establishes
in detail how consultation should be undertaken: in good faith,
using culturally-appropriate procedures.., aimed at reaching an

247. Id. at art. 19 ("States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the
indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in
order to obtain their free, prior[,] and informed consent before adopting and
implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them.").
248. Id. at art. 29 ("Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and
protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or
territories and resources.
States shall establish and implement assistance
programmes for indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without
discrimination.... States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or
disposal of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of
indigenous peoples without their free, prior[,] and informed consent .... States
shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that programmes for
monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous peoples, as
developed and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials, are duly
implemented.").
249. Id. at art. 30 ("Military activities shall not take place in the lands or
territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or
otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned....
States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples
concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their
representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military
activities.").
250. Id. at art. 32; see Jacquelyn A. Jampolsky & Kristen A. Carpenter,
Indigenous Rights, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 795, 801 (James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015).
251. For a full analysis of the current moment and prospective effect of
international Indigenous rights law, see Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela Riley,
Indigenous Peoples and the JurisgenerativeMoment in Human Rights, 102 CAL. L.
REV. 173 (2014).
252. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations,
Judgment, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245 (June 27, 2012).
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agreement. Thus, exploration or extraction of natural resources
cannot be done at the expense of an Indigenous community's
25' 3
means of physical or cultural survival on their own land.
Although most of the land affected by the oil exploration legally
belonged to the Sarayaku People, 254 about thirty-five percent of it
did not.
The Sarayaku People were thus able to leverage the
consultation proceedings to force clean up on lands outside their
legally recognized land base.
Like with usufructuary rights and contract rights,
consultation rights provide Native communities with a juridical
hook for participating in governance over lands they do not
necessarily own in fee. Those legal rights require discussions
among Native and non-Native stakeholders, and generate new
social spaces for Native people to engage as sovereigns-regardless
as to how the law may interpret those proceedings. By engaging
in consultation proceedings, Native and non-Native communities
co-create a governable space where both interact as sovereign.
This could lead to more sustainable approaches to nation-building
by fostering better relationships among neighbors.
IV. Broader Implications and Critiques
A.

Examples Outside the Natural Resources Context

More broadly, tribes have been expanding their offreservation sovereignty through governable spaces by forging new
synergies with local communities, states, and the federal
government that transcend the legal categories afforded by
property law. For example, in 2010, the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe
signed a monumental settlement agreement with the State of
Michigan after five years of litigation regarding the boundaries of
its reservation. 6 Where remedy in law seemed impossible to the
parties,
the settlement agreement not only declared all lands
within the reservation as Indian country, but also settled disputes
over governance "regarding criminal jurisdiction, environmental
regulation, taxes, land use, and public safety" outside reservation

253. Id.
177.
254. It is unclear whether the Sarayaku People owned the land in fee.
255. Carol Y. Verbeek, Free, Prior, Informed Consent: The Key to SelfDetermination: An Analysis of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 37 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 263, 274 (2013).
256. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe v. Granholm, No. 05-10296-BC, 2010 WL
5185114, at *2-*3 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2010).
257. Fletcher, Fort & Reo, supranote 68, at 71-72.
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boundaries, and, "[i]n exchange, the defendants received what
they wanted-certainty in jurisdictional questions, cooperation
from the Tribe, and resources to implement the agreement., 25 8
Federal, state, local, and tribal governments used the pending
litigation as the legal hook to generate new spaces of inclusive
exclusion, both within and outside reservation boundaries, which
largely exceed the rights afforded by fee title alone.
In addition to participating in multi-faceted settlement
negotiations involving the delegation rights as between
sovereigns,5 9 tribes have been expanding sovereignty outside
reservation boundaries through agreements to share certain rights
that are traditionally afforded to state or tribal governments. In
California, the Shingle Springs Rancheria Tribal Court has
partnered with the El Dorado County Superior Court to create the
first-ever joint-jurisdictional Wellness Court for cases involving
Tribal juveniles. 26 Recognizing the harmful and inefficient effect
of split or overlapping proceedings, the state court judge and
Tribal court judge share jurisdiction over certain cases to allow
"one unified proceeding designed to better address the issues
which brought the families into the court system. 261 Although this
court is still in its very nascent phases, such a partnership
demonstrates how tribes are expanding governance outside
reservation boundaries through governable spaces to express
perhaps the most contentious aspect of sovereignty-adjudicatory
jurisdiction. In this example, neither where the dispute happened
nor whom the dispute involved is exclusively dispositive 2 of
62
whether the state or Tribal court will exercise jurisdiction.
Instead, and perhaps more poignantly, state and Tribal court

258. Id. at 70.
259. For other examples of settlement negotiations between sovereigns, see
Fletcher, Fort & Reo, supra note 68.
260. SUZANNE KINGSBURY ET AL., SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK INDIANS &
EL DORADO CTY., CA. JOINT JURISDICTIONAL COURT 2014, THERAPEUTIC JUSTICE:
LESSONS FROM THE SHINGLE SPRINGS-EL DORADO COUNTY JOINT JURISDICTION
HEALING
TO
WELLNESS
COURT
(2014),
http ://www.tribal-institute.org/
2014/A12PP.pdf.
261. Shingle Springs Tribal Court and Superior Court of El Dorado County Will
Team Up To Hear Juvenile and Family Law Cases Involving Youth up to 24 Years
Old, MARKETWIRE NEWSROOM (June 6, 2014), http://www.marketwired.com/
pressrelease/shingle -springs-tribal-court- superior-court-el-dorado-countywil-teamuphear-juvenile-1918287.htm (quoting Suzanne Kingsbury, Presiding Judge of the
Superior Court of El Dorado County).
262. The jurisdictional hook is that the dispute must involve a tribal member
twenty-four years or younger; however, the court then uses a "wrap-around"
approach to bring in other family members who may also have pending cases
related to the dispute. See KINGSBURY ET AL., supra note 260.
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judges will consider those factors together and, where appropriate,
will jointly share jurisdiction. Again, this deemphasizes the role of
property as the determinative factor for delineating the scope of
tribal sovereignty and suggests how the governable spaces model
could be strategically useful.
B.

The Critique: Tribal Gaming

Although the governable spaces model provides conceptual
and strategic insights for how sovereigns can expand their role
outside reservation boundaries, the major limitation of this
approach brings us back to Bay Mills and the issue of tribal
gaming. The line of reasoning in the landmark case affirming
263
tribal gaming rights, California v. Cabazon,
affirmed the ability
of tribes to participate in gaming, in spite of state regulations, as
an extension of sovereignty originating from tribal land
ownership. 64 Today, tribes must construct gaming facilities on
"Indian lands," defined as "all lands within the limits of any
Indian reservation," ' and "any lands title to which is either held
in trust by the United States... or held by any Indian tribe or
individual subject to restriction by the United States against
alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental
power. '
Furthermore, IGRA requires that tribes retain "sole
proprietary interest" in the gaming facility when negotiating
financing and management contracts.1 7 Thus, property rights in
land are essential to tribal gaming activities as a threshold matter
of right, as a practical matter for development, and as a social
matter in terms of the likely success of any gaming institution and
of general acceptance by Native and non-Native community
members."'

263. California v. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
264. Alan E. Brown, Ace in the Hole: Land's Key Role in Indian Gaming, 39
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159, 176 (2005) ("The Cabazon Court viewed tribal land
ownership as the fundamental basis for tribal sovereignty.").
265. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4)(A) (2012).
266. Id. § 2703(4)(B); see also 25 C.F.R. § 502.12(a)-(b) (2015) (defining "Indian
lands" similarly); COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 190,
§ 12.02, at 876-77 (employing the "Indian lands" definitions set forth by 25 U.S.C.
§ 2703 and 25 C.F.R. § 502.12).
267. IGRA, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A) (2012); see also COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 190, § 12.02, at 877 (noting that Indian tribes
must be the primary beneficiary of a gaming operation when negotiating with
outside contractors seeking to do business in Indian gaming).
268. See Brown, supra note 264, at 176.
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Frankly, the governable spaces model offers little to overcome
the necessity of fee rights for federally recognized tribes seeking to
construct gaming facilities on Indian lands.
However, new
contours of the tribal gaming industry, namely, the potential
rights of state-recognized tribes and internet gaming, suggest the
model may still be useful. 269 Tribes not recognized by the federal
government, and therefore not recognized as sovereign nations by
virtue of their land rights within the federal system, may still be
able to engage in gaming activities where negotiated with a
state.270 In this case, federally unrecognized tribes may negotiate
with state governments amenable to tribal gaming activities,
thereby generating a new governable space in which to engage as
a sovereign. Because this negotiation falls outside the scope of the
IGRA, theoretically, agreements could even allow the construction
of gaming facilities on land leased or otherwise managed by the
tribe that the tribe does not own in fee and that remains under
state jurisdiction. 71

269. There are also instances of creative management contracting and leasing
provisions that may deemphasize the role of fee-title in tribal gaming, but the
intricacies of IGRA fall outside the scope of this Article.
For a better
understanding of IGRA from a lawyering perspective, see Kevin K. Washburn, The
Mechanics of Indian Gaming Management Contract Approval, 8 GAMING L. REV.
333 (2004).
270. See Alexa Koenig & Jonathan Stein, Lost in the Shuffle: State-Recognized
Tribes and the Tribal Gaming Industry, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 327, 330 (2006) ("We
explain that (1) the regulation of gaming is generally a state right, (2) state tribes
are sovereign governments with the right to game, except as preempted by the
federal government, (3) federal law does not preempt gaming by state tribes, and
thus states have the intrinsic power to enter into gaming compacts with the state
tribes they recognize, (4) state tribal gaming does not violate equal protection
guarantees, much as gaming by federally-recognized tribes complies with
Fourteenth Amendment mandates, and (5) significant policy arguments weigh in
favor of permitting gaming by state tribes under state law.").
271. The Author is not aware of any examples of this, but proposes the idea as
an untested theoretical approach that begs further research. In fact, in an
analogous context, even federally recognized tribes have been able to maneuver the
gaps between state and federal statutes to engage in economic development in the
context of Internet payday lending. Although this practice is both relatively new
and incredibly controversial, tribes have asserted immunity to shield partners from
state consumer protection laws to allow for more flexible lending schemes where
federal law is still lacking. See Nathalie Martin & Joshua Schwartz, The Alliance
Between Payday Lenders and Tribes: Are Both Tribal Sovereignty and Consumer
Protection at Risk?, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 751 (2012); Adam Mayle, Usury on the
Reservation: Regulation of Tribal-Affiliated Payday Lenders, 31 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 1053 (2012); Jennifer H. Weddle, Nothing Nefarious: The Federal Legal and
HistoricalPredicatefor Tribal Sovereign Lending, 61 FED. L. 58 (2014).
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This potential becomes equally relevant in the context of
internet gaming.2 72 Online gambling is a largely a-spatial activity
where neither proprietor nor patron relies on physical place.
Although online gaming requires the construction of some
material facility, where that facility lies on the landscape is not
dispositive of economic success. In fact, it may be even more
advantageous for tribes seeking to engage in nation-building
through internet gaming to do so outside reservation boundaries
as it would not be regulated under IGRA, and could provide more
flexibility for tribes to negotiate with states. 73 Tribal online
gaming laws are still very much in flux from federal, state, and
tribal vantage points. 74
A recent opinion from the U.S.
Department of Justice has affirmed that regulatory authority for
internet gaming lies in the hands of individual states, which opens
up a new frontier for negotiating potential benefits and challenges
for tribes. 75 This creates new governable spaces, which are not
necessarily contingent on tribal property rights in land, through
which tribes can engage in nation-building as sovereigns.
272. The legal framework regulating Internet gaming is complex and constantly
evolving in both tribal and non-tribal contexts, and it falls outside the scope of this
Article. For a summary of the current federal and state frameworks regulating
online gaming, see generally Charles P. Ciaccio, Jr., Internet Gambling: Recent
Developments and State of the Law, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529 (2010); David B.
Jordan, Rolling the Dice on the Cyber-Reservation: The Confluence of Internet
Gaming and Federal Indian Law, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 455 (2000); Joseph M.
Kelly, Internet Gambling Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 117 (2000); Heidi McNeil
Staudenmaier, Off-Reservation Native American Gaming: An Examination of the
Legal and Political Hurdles, 4 NEV. L.J. 301, 316 (2004); Nelson Rose & Rebecca
Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling: With Federal Approval, States Line Up To
Place Their Bets, 45 CONN. L. REV. 653, 675-84 (2012).
273. Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1104-05 (8th
Cir. 1999). However, this subjects the legality of internet gaming facilities to state
law.
274. Joseph M. Kelly, U.S. Land-Based and Internet Gambling: Would You Bet
on a Rosy Future?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 339, 354-55 (2010).
275. Keith C. Miller, The Internet Gambling Genie and the Challenges States
Face, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1, 28 (2013) ("Indian tribes stand to gain very little from
Internet gambling."); Rose & Bolin, supranote 272, at 675.
276. These concepts apply to economic development outside the gaming context,
as tribes continue to engage in nation-building as savvy market actors within
tribal, state, and national borders. Whether engaging in economic development as
a tribal government, a tribal enterprise, a tribe- or member-owned non-profit, a
formal or informal economic exchange, or a member or non-member owned
business, Native people re-work traditional social relationships by engaging with
the law vis-a-vis property (by selling goods, owning a business, managing
properties, etc.) through economic development and generate new governable
spaces in which to engage as sovereigns.
See Lorie M. Graham, An
InterdisciplinaryApproach to American Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L.
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Conclusion
In each of these examples, property functions as a tool of
governance by creating new social spaces for tribes and other
governments to engage in as sovereigns beyond the confines of fee
title. In the context of tribal resource management, gaming and
economic development, expansive settlement agreements, or
shared jurisdictional courts, state and tribal governments enact
new social narratives around property that deemphasize the role
of fee rights in land as necessary for defining tribal sovereignty.
This Article demonstrates how the governable spaces model
permits a broader understanding of sovereignty as a more diffuse
mode of governance, and attempts to free strategic and conceptual
conversations about sovereignty from fee-title in land. In doing so,
the Article seeks to inspire future scholarship that will go beyond
judicial or political understandings of property and sovereignty as
means for securing separate governmental rights, and begins to
address the socio-spatial and relational aspects of property as a
means for fostering better communities.

REV. 597 (2004); Alan P. Meister, Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Andrew Light,
Indian Gaming and Beyond: Tribal Economic Development and Diversification, 54
S.D. L. REV. 375 (2009).

